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Abstract
In late 2008, due to the confluence of the financial crisis and years of structural decline in
the auto industry, Chrysler was nearing bankruptcy. The US Treasury provided Chrysler’s
owner, Chrysler Holding, with a $4 billion bridge loan and Chrysler’s related finance
company, Chrysler Financial, with a $1.5 billion financing program under the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP). The government-led restructuring through bankruptcy
involved the commitment of roughly $5 billion in debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans from
the US Treasury and the Canadian government, under which the US Treasury ultimately
lent $1.89 billion, using TARP funds, and Canada lent about $1 billion, proportional to its
share of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) auto industry. It also involved
concessions from stakeholders, corporate governance arrangements for the “New
Chrysler,” and a merger with Italian automaker Fiat Automobiles S.p.A. Treasury financed
the purchase by the New Chrysler of substantially all of the old Chrysler’s assets with a
$7.14 billion loan. The bankruptcy case was controversial and nearly reached the US
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Supreme Court, but the restructuring ultimately rescued Chrysler. In the Chrysler rescue,
Treasury lost about $2.93 billion on an investment of about $10.47 billion.
Keywords: AIFP, auto finance, Canada, Chrysler, Export Development Canada, General
Motors, nonbanks, Treasury
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Restructuring Chrysler through Bankruptcy

At a Glance
In late 2008, due to the confluence of the
financial crisis and years of structural
decline in the auto industry, Chrysler was
nearing bankruptcy (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 35–37). In December, the US
Treasury provided Chrysler’s owner,
Chrysler Holding, with a $4 billion bridge
loan and Chrysler’s related finance
company, Chrysler Financial, with a $1.5
billion financing program under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 (EESA) (Office of Financial Stability
2018; Canis et al. 2009, 9; Office of
Management and Budget 2009). Treasury
also provided Chrysler’s parts suppliers
with aid and created a warranty guarantee
program (Office of Financial Stability 2018).
Treasury, in collaboration with the
Canadian government, helped the company
develop a plan to turn itself around
(Mathilakath and Urie 2009, PDF p. 14). The
plan, first announced on March 30, 2009,
involved assisting Chrysler in negotiating
concessions from its stakeholders, financing
Chrysler’s bankruptcy, and developing
corporate governance arrangements for the
“New Chrysler” that would support the
restructuring (Treasury 2009b, 1). The plan
also depended on the company’s merging
with Italian automaker Fiat Automobiles
S.p.A.

Summary of Key Terms
Proximate purpose: “Make it easier for […] Chrysler
to quickly clear away old debts […] so that they can
get back on their feet” (Obama 2009b).
Ultimate purpose: To “help revive modern
manufacturing and support our nation’s effort to
move toward energy independence, but only in the
context of a fundamental restructuring that will
allow these companies to prosper without taxpayer
support” (Treasury 2009b, 1).
Bankruptcy filing date
April 30, 2009
DIP financing date

May 5, 2009

Section 363 sale date
(effective end of
bankruptcy)

June 10, 2009

First Lien Credit
Agreement date

June 10, 2009

Legal authority

Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA)
of 2008, §101 (a)(1), §3
(9); Bankruptcy Code
Chapter 11 §363

Initial capital structure of
New
Chrysler

Fiat: 20%
Treasury: 9.85%
UAW VEBA: 67.69%
CDIC (Canada): 2.46%

Funders

US Department of the
Treasury, Export
Development Canada

Participants

Chrysler Holding LLC
(“Old Chrysler”), New
Carco LLC (“New
Chrysler”)

Total commitment

$10.47 billion3

Treasury and Export Development Canada TARP loss on investment $2.93 billion
(EDC) kept Chrysler alive with a roughly $5
billion debtor-in-possession (DIP) facility, under which the US Treasury ultimately lent
Of this: $4 billion was in bridge loans; $280.13 million in supplier support; $1.89 billion in DIP financing;
$6.64 billion in working capital.
3
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$1.89 billion and Canada lent about $1 billion, until the bankruptcy court could approve
Fiat-managed New Chrysler’s purchase of Chrysler’s usable assets (Chrysler, EDC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 95, 317, 322). The bankruptcy case was controversial and nearly
reached the Supreme Court (David 2010, 38). Treasury then financed this purchase as well
as New Chrysler’s early operations and partial assumption of debt associated with the
bridge loan with a $7.14 billion loan (the First Lien Credit Agreement facility). The
bankruptcy court liquidated what remained of the old Chrysler’s assets over the next
several years; Treasury recovered approximately $160 million on the sale of those assets,
less than 10% of the $1.89 billion it extended under the DIP facility (Office of Financial
Stability 2018).
Management, creditors, and organized labor gave significant concessions. Labor also
received a majority stake in New Chrysler (Rattner 2010, 157–59; Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp.
86–88). Treasury sold its remaining equity investments in New Chrysler in mid-2011, but
ultimately booked a net loss on its investments in Chrysler overall (Office of Financial
Stability 2018).
Summary Evaluation
The restructuring successfully turned around Chrysler, though policymakers acknowledge
that they saved Chrysler because of the potential damage to “the industrial Midwest,” not
because of Chrysler’s systemic importance (Rattner 2010, PDF p. 5). Some legal scholars
argue that the bankruptcy circumvented the US Bankruptcy Code’s safeguards for creditors
(COP 2009b, PDF pp. 95–103). Others argue that the government’s actions merely
mimicked that of any other debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender (COP 2009b, PDF p. 101).
Some observers have questioned whether making the auto companies eligible for TARP
went beyond the intent of Congress (COP 2009b, PDF pp. 71–80, 83–84).
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Context: United States 2008–2009
GDP (SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
converted to USD)
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
GDP per capita (SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$48,383 in 2008
$47,100 in 2009
As of Q4, 2008:

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

5-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking
system

Existence of deposit insurance

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in
2008
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in
2009
68.3% in 2008
66.9% in 2009
Banking system assets equal to
30.5% of financial system in 2008
Banking system assets equal to
30.2% of financial system in 2009
44.9% of total banking assets in
2008
44.3% of total banking assets in
2009
18% of total banking assets in 2008
16% of total banking assets in 2009
0% of banks owned by the state in
2008
0% of banks owned by the state in
2009
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2009

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank’s Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Bloomberg
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Overview

Background
Due to a number of factors stemming from the ongoing financial crisis and years of
systemic decline in the auto industry, Chrysler reached out to the United States
government for financial assistance in late 2008 (COP 2011, 9–11; Canis et al. 2009, 1–2;
Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 35–36). Upon hearing that the United States government was
aiding its auto industry, the Canadian government decided to join in on the restructuring
(Wilson 2008). The Treasury responded with a $4 billion Loan and Security Agreement
(the Bridge Loans) under its Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) on January 2,
2009 (for more on this program, see Nye 2021).4 According to the terms of the Bridge
Loans,5 Treasury would provide interim financing to the manufacturer, but additional
funding would be conditioned on Chrysler’s submitting a viable restructuring plan by
February 17, 2009 (Chrysler and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 59–60; Paulson 2010, 350–55).
The February 17, 2009, Viability Plan
Chrysler submitted a Viability Plan for three scenarios (Chrysler 2009, PDF p. 11). One
envisioned Chrysler continuing to survive on its own after a restructuring entailing
“sacrifices from all key stakeholders” (Kolka 2009, PDF p. 33). The second scenario
described a restructuring leveraging “the positive impact of synergies from” an alliance
with Fiat, an Italian auto manufacturer (Kolka 2009, PDF p. 33). This plan would see Fiat
receiving a 35% stake in Chrysler (that could be increased to 55% based on the
achievement of several milestones) in exchange for Chrysler’s access to technology and
distribution channels (Chrysler 2009, PDF p. 87). The third scenario anticipated the failure
of the other two plans and provided for Chrysler’s orderly wind-down and liquidation
(Kolka 2009, PDF p. 33).
Chrysler proposed that the United Auto Workers (UAW) union (and its Voluntary
Employee Benefits Association [VEBA]) make significant concessions and Chrysler
Financial alter its auto finance relationship with Chrysler (Kolka 2009, PDF pp. 33–34). It
also proposed that suppliers and dealers make significant concessions while Chrysler itself
undertake a number of other cost-cutting measures (Chrysler 2009, PDF p. 15). Chrysler
anticipated that Treasury would support its plans with $5 billion in Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP) funding, $6 billion in Department of Energy Section 136 funding, and that

For the same reasons, General Motors entered into a similar Loan and Security Agreement under the same
program. Similar to Chrysler, it also underwent a restructuring via bankruptcy after Treasury initially
rejected its viability plan.
4

5

See Nye 2021 for detailed description of the Bridge Loans.
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its secured creditors would agree to convert $5 billion in debt into Chrysler equity (Kolka
2009, PDF p. 26, 33-35). 6
Chrysler’s Initial Viability Plan Was Rejected
In a document entitled “Obama Administration New Path to Viability for GM & Chrysler”
(Treasury 2009b), issued March 30, 2009, the administration rejected the Viability Plan
and “determined that Chrysler has not demonstrated that it can achieve long-term viability
as a stand-alone company,” as required (Treasury 2009b, 1). Further, the administration
concluded that the Chrysler-Fiat partnership was not yet sufficient to support further
taxpayer investment (Treasury 2009b, 1).
The administration granted Chrysler an additional 30 days to meet certain requirements
for an amended plan, which if successful, would trigger the government’s investment of up
to $6 billion and a restructuring (Treasury 2009b, 1).7 If Chrysler failed to meet the stated
conditions, however, “the government will not invest any additional money in the
company” (Treasury 2009b, 1).
The conditions set forth in the New Path to Viability included: (1) restructuring Chrysler’s
balance sheet to extinguish the vast majority of its secured debt and all of unsecured debt
and equity, other than to trade creditors; (2) further concessions from the UAW and Fiat;
(3) an agreed-upon plan with Fiat that would not require more than $6 billion of taxpayer
investment to be successful; (4) a more viable plan for profitably operating in a normal
business environment; (5) a viable mechanism for dealer and customer financing; (6) a
“credible plan” for implementing the restructuring (Treasury 2009b, 1).
The Bridge Loans were accompanied by a similar Canadian program. The Canadian
government also rejected a similar viability plan on March 30, 2009 (C-SPAN 2009a).
Program Description
Program Purpose
On March 30, 2009, President Barack Obama described his administration’s program for a
successful Chrysler rescue (Obama 2009b). The goal was to save Chrysler and provide it
with an opportunity “to fundamentally restructure in a way that would justify an
investment of additional taxpayer dollars” and ultimately “stand on [its] own” (Obama
2009b). This meant making Chrysler a company that would be internationally competitive,
create new jobs for Americans, and produce fuel-efficient vehicles that would help the
United States become energy independent (Obama 2009b). The government support would
also enable Chrysler to consummate its merger with Fiat, who could bring its small-car
For comparison, General Motors’ Viability Plan asked for up to $16.6 billion more in TARP funds (GAO
2009a, PDF p. 17).
6

Chrysler requested $3.5 billion in Department of Energy Section 136 funding, but withdrew the request in
2012 without having received any funds from the program (Canis and Yacobucci 2015, 15).
7
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technology to the arrangement (Rattner 2011, 80). An additional key factor was to “make it
easier for […] Chrysler to quickly clear away old debts […] so that they can get back on their
feet” (Obama 2009b).
The Canadian government’s involvement in the program had a similar purpose. It wanted
to return Chrysler “to a viable, sustainable future,” which would help sustain an automotive
industry that was arguably largest segment of Canadian manufacturing (Office of the
Auditor General of Canada 2014; C-SPAN 2009a; Canada 2009).
Key Elements of the Program
The government took several steps to restructure Chrysler after the March 30
announcement. These included (1) direct and indirect participation in negotiations with
Chrysler, Fiat, and other stakeholders to achieve concessions that would enable Chrysler to
meet the Viability Plan’s requirements, (2) directly and indirectly financing Chrysler to
facilitate a bankruptcy via the US Bankruptcy Code, (3) developing corporate governance
arrangements with Chrysler’s stakeholders that would protect the taxpayer while
supporting Chrysler’s future success.
The Revised Viability Plan of April 20098
Negotiating the Revised Viability Plan
To reorganize quickly, Chrysler had to renegotiate with a number of its stakeholders.
During this time, Treasury acted as a facilitator, a mediator, and sometimes as a lead
negotiator (Rattner 2011, 152–59, 173–77).
A Viable Mechanism for Dealer and Consumer Financing
Treasury facilitated a new automotive financing relationship for Chrysler. In the
relationship, GMAC was to replace Chrysler Financial as Chrysler’s auto finance partner
(Treasury 2009a, 5; COP 2010, PDF pp. 27, 49). After “extended, intense, arm’s-length
negotiations between Chrysler, GMAC, and the U.S. Treasury,” GMAC and Chrysler agreed
on a Master Auto Finance Agreement Term Sheet, dated April 30, 2009 (the GMAC MAFA)
(Keegan 2009, 4). This term sheet established the Chrysler-GMAC financing relationship
contingent on GMAC’s receiving a capital injection from Treasury, various regulatory
approvals, and Chrysler’s meeting several milestones in the bankruptcy court by May 16,
2009 (Keegan 2009, 4; Chrysler and GMAC, PDF p. 6).

On April 30, 2009, after negotiations similar to those at Treasury, the governments of Canada and Ottawa
issued a press release announcing that Chrysler had met its requirements for viability. Chrysler Canada
received additional secured loans, and the Canadian government also announced financial support for
Chrysler’s bankruptcy in the US. For Canada, the overall goal of the program was to support Chrysler’s “return
to a viable, sustainable future” (Canada 2009). The means for achieving this goal was contributing to the
efforts of the United States and maintaining Canada’s 20% production share in the industry (Office of the
Auditor General of Canada 2014).
8
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Extinguishing Unsecured Debt
Treasury played an active role in negotiations addressing Chrysler’s unsecured debt. The
UAW VEBA agreed to restructure its $8.8 billion in unsecured claims against Chrysler,
cutting Chrysler’s health care costs by more than 40% in the process (Rattner 2011, 153–
154, 157)9. In exchange, “New Chrysler,” the company that would emerge from the
bankruptcy as the operating company, agreed to give VEBA a 55% stake in a restructured
Chrysler and a $4.6 billion promissory note (COP 2009b, 28).
Further Concessions from the UAW
Treasury facilitated negotiations between Fiat, Chrysler, and the UAW that led to “a new
collective bargaining relationship” (Kolka 2009, PDF pp. 5, 8). This included, but was not
limited to:
•

Increasing the number of lower wage “tier-2” workers that Chrysler would be
allowed to hire (Rattner 2011, 158–59);

•

Committing to freeze wages for “entry-level” employees through the end of the
collective bargaining agreement (2011) (Exhibit J (part 1) 2009, PDF p. 8); and

•

Committing “to have any open issues at the end of the next negotiation be subject to
binding arbitration based on maintaining competitive wages with the transplants
[foreign automakers manufacturing in the US],” (Rattner 2011, 157–59).10

Agreeing to a More Viable Business Plan and an Agreed Partnership with Fiat That Would
Need No More Than $6 Billion in Government Support
Treasury acted as mediator between Fiat and Chrysler as they negotiated their partnership
(Rattner 2011 156–57). Fiat and Chrysler agreed on a more aggressive business plan that
would form the foundation of their negotiations with the First Lien Secured creditors. Fiat
would obtain a stake in New Chrysler in exchange for technological and management
resources (Treasury 2009c). It is not clear what else was in the agreement.
Restructuring the Balance Sheet
Extinguishing Second Lien Secured Debt
Treasury did not appear to play a major role in negotiations with Cerberus and Daimler,
the Second Lien Secured creditors who were also Chrysler’s majority and minority
shareholders. Much of this debt was related to Cerberus’ acquisition of Chrysler from

There is no consistent figure for the size of the unsecured claims that the UAW VEBA intended to
restructure. Some sources say the VEBA had $8.8 billion in unsecured claims, some say $8 billion, and some
go as high as $10.6 billion (COP 2009b, 28; Rattner 2011, 153–54, 157; Foley, Goldberg, and Meyer 2010, 5).
9

10

This effectively amounted to a “no-strike” provision (Barkholz 2011).
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Daimler in 2007 (Docket 190 2009, 7). Chrysler (under orders from Cerberus) and Daimler
had issued pension guarantees to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) with
respect to Chrysler’s underfunded pension obligations (a $1 billion guarantee by Daimler
and $200 million guarantee from Chrysler) (Docket 190 2009, 7; Kolka 2009, 5, 15, 32).
The two parties agreed to relinquish their equity stakes in Chrysler, forgive $2 billion in
loans to Chrysler, return ownership of the Chrysler headquarters, and contribute more
than $600 million toward pension claims (Docket 190 2009, 7; Kolka 2009, 5, 15, 32;
Treasury 2009c; PBGC 2011).
Extinguishing First Lien Secured Debt
Treasury led negotiations with the holders of Chrysler’s $6.9 billion in First Lien Secured
debt and managed relations with holdout creditors from this group (Rattner 2009, 4–5; Das
and Das 2009). This resulted in an April 28, 2009, agreement among the holders of 70% of
the First Lien Secured debt (Kolka 2009, 33) under which they would be paid about 29
cents on the dollar.11 However, the holders of 70% of the First Lien Secured debt were
unable to convince the remaining holdout creditors to join an agreement before the
government-imposed April 30, 2009, deadline (Rattner 2011, 176–181).12
The Auto Warrantee Commitment Program (AWCP), a government program that
guaranteed the warrantees of GM and Chrysler vehicles while they went through
restructuring, was set to expire on June 30, 2010, for Chrysler and on July 31, 2010, for GM.
GM and Chrysler could exit the program any time after they finished restructuring (GM and
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 353; Chrysler and Treasury 2008, PDF p. 369).13 Funding held by the
AWCP special purpose vehicles (SPVs) following a company’s exit from the program
(assuming its exit was due to completing restructuring and not failing) would first be used
to pay interest and reduce principal on the Treasury loan. GM and Chrysler would then be
entitled to any funds left over (GM 2008, PDF p. 353; Chrysler and Treasury 2008, PDF p.
369).
Chrysler Met the Viability Conditions
The results of Chrysler’s negotiations did not fully conform to the requirements in the New
Pathway to Viability (Treasury 2009c; Treasury 2009b, 1). Nevertheless, on April 30, 2009,

Rattner said that this agreement (which was not publicized or was merely an informal agreement) would
have allowed Chrysler to restructure outside of bankruptcy while $2.5 billion from Treasury would be used to
settle Chrysler’s First Lien Secured debt (Rattner 2011, 172–77).
11

Law professor Henry Hu said that some of these creditors may have become holdouts because they were
able to purchase credit default swaps (CDS) on Old Chrysler’s debt and/or “securities of Chrysler’s
competitors (i.e., Ford and General Motors) on the theory that, were Chrysler to go bankrupt, those securities
would increase in value,” therefore reducing risk in their exposure to an Old Chrysler bankruptcy (Hu 2014,
371).
12

What it would mean to “finish restructuring” is left undefined, but presumably this meant emerging from
bankruptcy. To exit the program after finishing restructuring, the companies were required to provide
written notice to this effect.
13
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Treasury issued a press release declaring that Chrysler had met the requirements for
viability (Treasury 2009c). The press release noted that “Chrysler’s key stakeholders have
made unprecedented sacrifices and executed an agreement that positions Chrysler for a
viable future” (Treasury 2009c). This press release also outlined Treasury’s plan to use the
US Bankruptcy Code to “clear away” Chrysler’s liabilities without rewarding First Lien
Secured holdout creditors, the “group of investment firms and hedge funds […] [that] failed
to accept reasonable offers to settle on their debt” (Treasury 2009c). Chrysler then filed a
bankruptcy petition on April 30, 2009, beginning the company’s pathway through Chapter
11 (Docket 190 2009).
The following lays out the mechanics of the restructuring. Pursuant to a Master Transaction
Agreement (MTA), Chrysler (which would then be called “Old Chrysler”) would sell all of
the assets and liabilities necessary for running the post-restructuring business to New
Chrysler (a new corporation formed by Fiat) using Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In exchange, New Chrysler assumed most of Old Chrysler’s liabilities (approximately $29
billion out of about $50 billion) and paid Old Chrysler $2 billion in cash (COP 2009b, 19;
Chrysler 2011a, 51, 252, 326).14 Old Chrysler would retain the claims of the First Lien
Secured creditors, who would receive about 29 cents on the dollar. It would also retain
obligations to Second Lien creditors, Daimler and Cerberus, and the US Treasury and
Canadian government DIP loans, but there would be no money left over for these parties
(COP 2009b, 20). The $2 billion received by Old Chrysler and any retained assets would
become its “bankruptcy estate” which it would use to partially repay First Lien Secured
creditors, and it would gradually wind down (COP 2009b, 20).
New Chrysler would operate the auto manufacturing business that everyday people
identified as Chrysler. It would begin with $33 billion in assets and $29 billion in liabilities
(Chrysler 2011a, 326).
Program Funding
Treasury and Canada Covered Chrysler’s Negative Cash Flows during the Bankruptcy under a
Joint Debtor-In-Possession (DIP) Facility, Which Treasury Team Members Did Not Expect to
Be Repaid
Treasury and EDC jointly executed a $4.1 billion Joint DIP Facility with Old Chrysler on May
5, 2009.15 However, they revised this commitment to $4.96 billion when the bankruptcy
court entered a Final Order approving DIP financing on May 20, 2009 (Docket 1309 2009,
PDF pp. 1–2). Each lender was responsible for only that portion of the total that it had
committed to make (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 37). The allocation was
roughly three to one, US to Canadian dollars, as shown in Figure 1 (Chrysler, EDC, and
Chrysler’s Canadian and Mexican subsidiaries fell under Old Chrysler subsidiary Alpha Holding LP, which
itself underwent Chapter 11 proceedings joined with Old Chrysler’s for administrative reasons (Docket 2188
2009; Docket 1784 2009).
14

The Joint DIP Facility was officially called the “Second Lien Secured Priming Superpriority Debtor-InPossession Credit Agreement” (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 32).
15
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Treasury 2009, PDF p. 95). Prior to the issuance of the bankruptcy court’s Final Order, the
agreement limited the amount that Treasury and EDC could lend under the facility to an
“Interim Commitment” of $1.4 billion (this was later revised to $1.8 billion) (Chrysler, EDC,
and Treasury 2009, 7, 15).
Chrysler did not expect to pay back the DIP loan and Treasury did not expect to be repaid.
In a court document filed on April 30, Robert Manzo, Chrysler’s financial advisor, provided
cash flow and balance-sheet projections that assumed Treasury would not be repaid either
for the $4 billion Bridge Loan or the $4.5 billion DIP facility (Manzo 2009, PDF p. 49). The
DIP loan would be forgiven immediately. His cash flow analysis, submitted to the court
three days later, projected that the DIP funding would be just sufficient to cover Chrysler’s
cash flow needs during the expected nine-week bankruptcy process (Docket 190 2009, PDF
180).
Treasury Auto Team members (a group of advisors led by Treasury Secretary Geithner)
also told the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in June 2009 that they did not expect
the Treasury would receive repayment for the DIP investments (SIGTARP 2009, 108).
In the bankruptcy filing, Chrysler Vice Chairman Thomas LaSorda stated that the
government’s DIP financing was essential to cover Chrysler’s negative cash flows. “No party
other than the United States Government is willing to provide the necessary DIP financing.
Chrysler’s cash situation is dire and it continues to function only because of the $4 billion it
has already received from the U.S. Government. Without the Government’s support over
the past four months, Chrysler would not have had the cash flow to continue and would
already be in bankruptcy. And without the Government’s support going forward, Chrysler
will have no choice but to liquidate” (LaSorda 2009, 75).
Principal and Additional Consideration
Under the Joint DIP Facility, any advances requested by Old Chrysler would concurrently
and proportionately draw on Treasury’s and EDC’s commitments based on how much each
party committed to the Joint DIP Facility.16 With each advance under the commitments,
Treasury and EDC would receive additional promissory notes for 6.67% of the value of
their respective advances—these promissory notes were called Additional Notes—bearing
as additional consideration the same interest rate and terms as the Facility (Chrysler, EDC,
and Treasury 2009a, PDF pp. 9, 49; Manzo 2009, PDF p. 168). Any payments that Old
Chrysler made on the loans or on the Additional Notes would be similarly distributed pro
rata between Treasury and EDC (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 36–37).

For example, if Chrysler requested a $100 million advance when the Joint DIP Facility had a maximum
commitment of $4.1 billion, Chrysler would receive approximately $26 million from EDC’s commitment and
approximately $74 million from Treasury’s commitment.
16
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Figure 1: Joint DIP Facility Commitments
Joint DIP Facility
commitments as of
5/5/2009

Interim commitments

Maximum commitment

Usage

Additional consideration
(Interest-bearing promissory
notes known as Additional Notes)

US Treasury

$1.04 billion

$3.04 billion
(later increased to $3.8 billion)

$1.89 billiona

$202.98 million (later increased
to $253.46 million)b

Export Development
Canada

$0.36 billion

$1.06 billion
(later increased to $1.16 billion)

~C$1.28 billion
($1 billion)c

$70.49 million
(later increased to
$77.37 million)d

Total

$1.4 billion

$4.1 billion
(later increased to $4.96 billion)

Unknowne

$273.05 million (later increased
to $330.83 million)f

(a) See Office of Financial Stability 2018.
(b) See Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 49, 322.
(c) See Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014. Dollar figure approximated using exchange rate of $0.80 per C$1.00.
(d) See Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 49, 322.
(e) There is no report showing the peak usage of the combined Treasury and EDC commitments.
(f) See Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 49, 322.
Sources: Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009; Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014; Office of Financial Stability 2018.
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Form of Proceeds
Both the loans and the Additional Notes were dollar denominated and either eurodollar
rate loans (which the loan documents called eurodollar loans) or alternative base rate
loans (referred to in the loan documents as ABR loans) (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 8–9, 15–18, 20–21, 302). The default form was eurodollar loans (Chrysler, EDC,
and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 32, 35–36). These eurodollar loans functionally had an interest
rate of the three-month eurodollar rate (with a 2.00% floor) plus 3.00%, though the ABR
depended on circumstances in the market (GAO 2009b, 135).
Maturity Date
The loans and Additional Notes matured at the earliest of:
•

“60 days after the […] [April 30, 2009] Petition Date”

•

“35 days after […] [April 30, 2009] if the Final Order has not become final and nonappealable prior to the expiration of such 35-day period”

•

“the effective date of a plan of reorganization or liquidation that is confirmed
pursuant to an order entered in the Cases by the Bankruptcy Court”

•

“the acceleration of any Loans and the Additional Notes and the termination of the
Commitment in accordance with the terms of this Agreement”

•

September 30, 2009 (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 22)

Collateral and Priority
The Joint DIP Facility was secured by substantially all of Old Chrysler’s assets as collateral
(Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7–8). Before the bankruptcy, the Treasury only
enjoyed third-priority liens on most of Chrysler’s assets, but the Joint DIP Facility lent to
Old Chrysler under Section 364(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (Docket 2130 2009, PDF p.
279; Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 44). With the approval of the bankruptcy
judge, the loan under the Joint DIP Facility could jump ahead of, or “prime,” the loans of
other secured creditors and gain perfected, first-priority security interests in and liens on
substantially all of Old Chrysler’s assets; this was colloquially referred to as “superpriority
status”(Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7, 30, 44).17

Some of Old Chrysler’s assets were not included in the collateral. Specifically, the capital stock of foreign
subsidiaries of Old Chrysler that “would not result in deemed dividends to” Old Chrysler (Chrysler, EDC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 44–45).
17
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Use of Proceeds, Prepayment, and Oversight
Old Chrysler was to use the proceeds of the loans to finance Old Chrysler’s “working capital
needs, capital expenditures, […] payment of warranty claims and other general corporate
purposes […] including the payment of expenses associated with the administration” of the
bankruptcy (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 47).
Old Chrysler was required to make prepayments when it incurred any indebtedness or
received funds from a transaction (called an “Extraordinary Receipt”) not permitted by the
Joint DIP Facility.18 Any such prepayment would be applied to Old Chrysler’s financial
obligations under the Joint DIP Facility and correspondingly reduce the maximum
commitment by the same amount (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 33–34).
The Joint DIP Facility seemed to contain more stringent oversight requirements than the
Bridge Loans (for more on the Bridge Loans, see Nye 2021). For example, the Bridge Loans
demanded biweekly reporting while the Joint DIP Facility required weekly reporting from
Chrysler. On a weekly basis, Old Chrysler had to certify to Treasury and EDC that Chrysler
had not defaulted and was in compliance with covenants relating to the company’s
financial condition (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 53, 61). Old Chrysler also
had to submit weekly updates to their 13-week projections and weekly variance reports
detailing how Chrysler’s practices conformed to its bankruptcy budget (Chrysler, EDC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 31, 53–54).
Old Chrysler had to give the lenders notice of and copies of its pleadings in the bankruptcy
case (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, 54). On top of that, Old Chrysler had to submit a
“Monthly Budget […] in form and substance satisfactory to the Required Lenders” within 10
days after the first successful use of Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (Chrysler, EDC,
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 54). The Joint DIP Facility also included several other reporting
requirements. Old Chrysler had to submit quarterly reports (beginning with September 30,
2009) detailing the implementation of an internal controls policy and Old Chrysler’s
compliance with those internal controls to the lenders as well as Old Chrysler’s actual use
of the loan proceeds (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 59).
Covenants
The Joint DIP Facility contained several affirmative covenants—in layman’s terms,
promises to do something—that created conditions on lending to Old Chrysler and
incorporated various burden-sharing arrangements from earlier Treasury loans to
Chrysler. In effect, these would help make sure that Chrysler did not collapse during the
bankruptcy or help reduce taxpayer risk if Chrysler could not survive bankruptcy.
In addition to the usual affirmative commitments that come with large secured loans—for
example, the requirement that Old Chrysler had to file its taxes in a timely manner—the
Joint DIP Facility made the interim $1.4 billion and final $4.1 billion commitments
18

Functionally, this meant indebtedness outside of the ordinary course of business.
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contingent on Old Chrysler’s quickly meeting a number of milestones in the bankruptcy
process (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 55). For one, Old Chrysler was required
to file motions to approve the Section 363 transaction by May 4, 2009 (Chrysler, EDC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF p. 61).
The Joint DIP Facility also incorporated various burden-sharing provisions related to
executive privileges and compensation, restrictions on expenses, private aircraft
divestment, and compliance with the Employ American Workers Act (EAWA) imposed on
Chrysler as well as Chrysler Financial by the Bridge Loans and the January 16, 2009
Chrysler Financial facility (Nye 2021; Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 57–59).
The Joint DIP Facility had several typical negative covenants—put simply, promises not to
do certain things—for large secured loans. However, there were also negative covenants
that distributed the burden between the two lenders and limited the lenders’ financial risk.
Canadian subsidiaries had to maintain a certain cash balance, but there was a limit on how
much Chrysler could invest in subsidiaries like Chrysler Canada (Chrysler, EDC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 62, 66, 68). As for covenants managing taxpayer risk, the Joint DIP
Facility forbade Old Chrysler from conducting asset sales outside of a limited set of
circumstances including but not limited to a successful bankruptcy proceeding, a winddown, and the licensing of intellectual property (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p.
63). The Joint DIP facility also restricted Old Chrysler’s and its subsidiaries’ ability to pay
dividends (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 63–64).
Treasury Lent New Chrysler $7.14 Billion to Finance the Section 363 Sale and Subsidize
Chrysler’s Reorganization
On June 10, 2009, the bankruptcy court approved the Section 363 sale and Treasury’s
proposed $7.14 billion loan to New Chrysler, known as the First Lien Credit Agreement
(David 2010, 31–32). That loan consisted of $6.64 billion in new funding to New Chrysler
(Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 1, 41).
New Chrysler also assumed from Old Chrysler a $500 million obligation to Treasury. This
obligation represented a portion of the $4 billion Bridge Loan that Treasury had extended
to Chrysler in January 2009 (Docket 3232 2009, PDF p. 210). The remaining $3.5 billion
principle on the Bridge Loan stayed with the Old Chrysler. It was settled with a $1.9 billion
payment in May 2010; Treasury took a $1.6 billion loss on the Bridge Loan.
The $7.14 billion loan was divided into two tranches. In Tranche B, New Chrysler paid $2
billion of the new funding to Old Chrysler in exchange for substantially all of its assets
(Chrysler et al. 2009, PDF p. 10). Old Chrysler used the $2 billion to partially repay secured
creditors who were owed $6.9 billion.
In Tranche C, New Chrysler received $4.64 billion that it could use for working capital, the
various administrative fees associated with the $2 billion purchase, and transitioning its
auto financing partnership to GMAC (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 41, 44, 59).
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Tranche B and Tranche C shared terms related to the loans’ security, prepayment, the use
of payments, oversight, contingencies, and various covenants.
Tranche B
Funding from Tranche B became available to New Chrysler on June 10, 2009, as soon as the
First Lien Credit Agreement closed in the aftermath of the Section 363 sale’s approval in
bankruptcy court (David 2010, 39; Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF p. 12). As additional consideration for the loan, Treasury would receive a 9.85%
stake in New Chrysler (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 52;
COP 2011, 56–57). To borrow funds under Tranche B, New Chrysler had to submit a
document indicating the “amount of the Tranche B Loan requested from the Lender and
[…] the amount of loans concurrently requested by Chrysler Canada” under its postpetition financing arrangement with EDC (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF p. 41).19
Proceeds from Tranche B would either carry an eurodollar interest rate or an ABR (see
Figure 2 for details on the interest rates) (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 44, 47–50). The per annum interest rate would be the former in
most circumstances, the three-month eurodollar rate (with a 2.00% floor) plus 5.00% (GAO
2009b, 135). The Tranche B loans matured on December 10, 2011, but the underlying loan
documents gave New Chrysler the ability to “extend the maturity date of up to $400 million
of the Tranche B loans to the Tranche C Maturity Date,” which was June 10, 2017, for a
1.50% per annum penalty fee (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 8, 41, 45, 47–48). Any overdue principal payments imposed a 2.00% penalty rate
(regardless of the form of the loan) and any overdue interest payments bore an interest
rate of the applicable ABR plus 2.00% (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 47–49).

This Canadian arrangement was the “Amended and Restated Loan Agreement dated as of June 10, 2009,
between Chrysler Canada and EDC” (alternatively known as the Canadian Facility Agreement) (Chrysler
Canada and EDC 2011).
19
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Figure 2: Tranche B Interest Rates
Eurodollar per annum interest rate = 𝐞𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐝𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐫 𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝 +
𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧
eurodollar base rate
Eurodollar rate for interest period formula:1.00−eurocurrency reserve requirements

Applicable margin:
• From closing until maturity: 5.00%
• From maturity on: 6.50%
Eurodollar base rate: Floor set at 2.00%
Eurocurrency reserve requirement: Aggregate of maximum rates of reserve
requirements under any regulations of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors or any
other governmental authority with jurisdiction over “reserve requirements prescribed
for eurocurrency funding […] maintained by a member bank of the Federal Reserve
System”
For EDC, the First Lien Credit Agreement set the eurocurrency reserve requirement to
$0.
Alternative Base Rate (ABR) per annum interest rate = 𝐀𝐁𝐑 + 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧
ABR: the largest of the prime rate, the effective federal funds rate plus half of 1.00%, and
the one-month eurodollar rate plus 1.00%
Applicable margin:
• From closing until maturity: 4.00%
• From maturity on: 5.50%
Sources: Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7–8, 16, 18, 23–24, 48–49, 52.

Tranche C
New Chrysler could access funding from Tranche C once it started drawing on the Tranche
B loans (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 41). Tranche C
contained a $4.64 billion commitment by Treasury for working capital (Chrysler, New
Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 41). The underlying agreement said that
New Chrysler would assume $500 million in Old Chrysler’s pre-petition Bridge Loans from
Treasury, which were categorized as Tranche C loans (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition
LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 45; see Nye 2021 for more on the Bridge Loans). Also, $350
million of the Tranche C funding was earmarked for GMAC Loans, which New Chrysler
could solely use “to fund Additional GMAC Transfers” related to New Chrysler’s impending
transition to using GMAC as its financing partner (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 20, 44, 50).20

The First Lien Credit Agreement referred to this earmark as the “GMAC Sublimit” (Chrysler, New Carco
Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 20).
20
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In consideration of the Tranche C commitment, on the closing date, New Chrysler was to
issue Additional Notes (additional promissory notes) with a principal of $288 million to
Treasury (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 65). The notes
would carry the same interest rate as the corresponding loan and would have the same
term (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p7–8, 16). This
consideration for Tranche C also included a Zero Coupon Note (zero-coupon promissory
notes) with a principal of $100 million,21 which had the same term as the Tranche C loans
and carried a eurodollar interest rate (Chrysler 2011b, 85, 182; Chrysler, New Carco
Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 47, 52). The Zero Coupon Notes carried only a
eurodollar interest rate (see Figure 3).
Each form of the Tranche C loan proceeds had its own interest rate (see Figure 3 for
details). In most circumstances, the eurodollar interest rate per annum for the loans and
Additional Notes was the three-month eurodollar rate (with a 2.00% floor) plus 7.91%
(GAO 2009b, 135). The loans were to mature on June 10, 2017 (Chrysler 2011c, 182). Any
overdue principal payments bore an additional 2.00% of interest per annum (regardless of
the form of the loan) and any overdue interest payments bore an interest rate of the
applicable ABR rate plus 2.00% per annum (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 47–50). Loans advanced under Tranche C accrued “PIK [paymentin-kind] Interest on a quarterly basis in an amount equal to $17,000,000 per quarter, which
will accrete on a straight line basis through the [June 10, 2017] Tranche C Maturity Date”
and then “be added to the principal balance of the Tranche C Loans” quarterly in addition
to any other interest (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 42).
New Chrysler could prepay the Tranche C to reduce this quarterly PIK Interest “by a
calculated percentage” (Chrysler 2011c, 205).

Technically, the First Lien Credit Agreement said that the principal of the Zero Coupon Notes would be the
amount in the Loss Sharing Payment Account remaining on “the first business day after the 363 sale and
immediately after U.S. Dealer Automotive Receivables Transaction LLC transferred funds in the Loss Sharing
Payment Account in excess of $100 million” to New Chrysler (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 20, 40). In theory, this would make the amount remaining in the Loss Sharing
Payment Account $100 million.
21
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Figure 3: Tranche C Interest Rates
Eurodollar per annum interest = 𝐞𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐝𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐫 𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝 +
𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧
eurodollar base rate
Eurodollar rate for interest period formula:1.00−eurocurrency reserve requirements

Applicable margin:
• Eurodollar loans: 7.91%
• Eurodollar Additional Notes: 7.91%
• Zero Coupon Notes: 0% (before the May 2013 expiration of the GMAC Master
Agreement) and 7.91% after such a date
Eurodollar base rate: Floor set at 2.00%
Eurocurrency reserve requirement: Aggregate of maximum rates of reserve
requirements under any regulations of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors or any
other Governmental Authority with jurisdiction over “reserve requirements prescribed
for eurocurrency funding […] maintained by a member bank of the Federal Reserve
System”
For EDC, the eurocurrency reserve requirement was set to $0.
Alternative Base Rate (ABR) per annum interest = 𝐀𝐁𝐑 + 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐢𝐧
ABR: the largest of the Prime Rate, the effective federal funds rate plus half of 1.00%,
and the one-month eurodollar rate plus 1.00%
Applicable margin:
• ABR loans: 6.91%
• ABR Additional Notes: 6.91%
Source: Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7–8, 16, 18, 23–24, 48–49, 52.

Terms Shared between Tranche B and Tranche C
The loans appear to have been dollar denominated and were either eurodollar loans or
ABR loans, similar to the terms of the DIP as described at page 7 (Chrysler, New Carco
Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 41, 44). The default form was eurodollar
loans. However, if lenders were unable to determine eurodollar rate adequately or if
eurodollar loans became illegal, the proceeds took the form of ABR loans. Both tranches
operated as nonrevolving and any amount repaid or prepaid reduced the respective
commitment amount (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp.
36, 41, 46). For both tranches, any interest that accrued from June 10, 2009, through
December 31, 2009, would be added to the principal of the loan as payment-in-kind (PIK)
interest rather than being paid off in cash (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 47–48). This effectively deferred the first half year of New
Chrysler’s interest payments to Treasury until December 2011 (Chrysler, New Carco
Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 8, 41, 45, 47–48). New Chrysler also granted
Treasury powers under an Equity Recapture Agreement as consideration, though not as
consideration for Tranche B or Tranche C (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF p. 52). These powers caused Treasury, rather than the VEBA, to be the
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main economic beneficiary of increases in the value of Chrysler equity above a certain level
(COP 2011, 56–57). Treasury evidently received the powers on account of its “making
available financial accommodations” to New Chrysler (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition
LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 52). Other shared terms included the prepayment
provisions, which imposed a burden-sharing measure with Canada and a prepayment
priority order (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 46–48).
Prepayment Policy
First, any prepayment made by New Chrysler related to the First Lien Credit Agreement
triggered an obligation for Chrysler Canada to prepay to EDC an amount proportional to
such a payment to Treasury. (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 36, 41, 46). This prevented New Chrysler from prepaying its debts to Treasury
before its debts to EDC. There was also a mandatory prepayment of 50% of the outstanding
loans, Additional Notes, and Zero Coupon Notes under Tranche C due on June 10, 2016
(Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 46–47).22
Security and Collateral
The loans, Additional Notes, and Zero Coupon Notes under the First Lien Credit Agreement
were secured using a “Security Agreement”23 that created what appears to be a blanket lien
on substantially all of New Chrysler’s tangible and intangible assets (with exceptions for
certain types of subsidiaries and joint ventures. (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 61–62, 70–72).
Oversight
The First Lien Credit Agreement dispensed with the weekly reporting requirements from
the Joint DIP Facility. Instead, it imposed less frequent reporting requirements similar to
those in the Bridge Loans. For example, New Chrysler had to provide unaudited financials
within 45 days of “the end of each of the first three quarterly periods” beginning September
30, 2009, and audited financials within 120 days of the end of each fiscal year (Chrysler,
New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 66–67).
Conditions
Similar to the affirmative covenants in the Joint DIP Facility, the First Lien Credit
Agreement had many conditions. These made drawing on Tranche B and Tranche C
conditional on the auto company’s success in the bankruptcy proceedings, in addition to
the usual requirements for large secured loans (for example, New Chrysler’s

This provision also automatically reduced Treasury’s commitment under Tranche C by 50% on this same
date. The remaining 50% of Tranche C matured on June 10, 2017, as indicated earlier (Chrysler, New Carco
Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 46–47).
22

23

The “Security Agreement” was not accessible as of July 1, 2019.
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“environmental affairs” must have satisfied Treasury) (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition
LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 62, 64–65).
Covenants
The affirmative and negative covenants in the First Lien Credit Agreement included a
domestic production volume requirement that would last until the later of five years or
until New Chrysler finished repaying any obligations under the Agreement (Chrysler, New
Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 76–77). The Agreement also gave
Treasury a veto over the renomination of certain members of New Chrysler’s board as well
as a veto over the nomination of successors or replacements for certain members of the
board (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 77–78). New
Chrysler would also find itself bound by a minimum earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) requirement for more than a year, which would
further restrict its operations (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 78, 82–83). In addition to several generic restrictions on New Chrysler’s operations
(restrictions on new indebtedness, asset sales, payment of dividends), New Chrysler had to
adhere to the various TARP and EAWA burden-sharing conditions (encompassing expense
policies, private aircraft use, executive compensation, and the like) imposed by Treasury’s
various loans to Old Chrysler (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF pp. 73–76, 78–83). However, New Chrysler could free itself from some of the more
generic restrictions (asset sale restrictions, restricted transactions with affiliates, among
others) by obtaining and maintaining “Investment Grade Ratings from two Rating
Agencies” (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 82–83).
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Figure 4: Summary of Joint DIP Facility and the Post-Petition First Lien Credit Agreement
Facility

Joint Debtor-In-Possession (DIP) Facility

First Lien Credit Agreement

Tranche

N/A (one tranche)

Tranche B

Tranche C

Old Chrysler
(and indirectly GMAC)
$4.1 billion ($1.4 billion until final
approval from bankruptcy court);
increased to $4.96 billion on May 15,
2009a
$1.89 billion (US) and approximately
$1 billion (Canada)d

New Chrysler (and
indirectly Old Chrysler)

New Chrysler
(and indirectly GMAC)

$2 billionb

$5.14 billionc

Recipient
Maximum
principal
Usage at peak

$7.14 billione

Tranche B was used to purchase Old Chrysler assets in a Section 363
sale
Tranche C was used for working capital, with $350 million
Purpose
Funded Old Chrysler during bankruptcy
earmarked for the GMAC transition. Of the total, $500 million
provided for the payment of a $500 million portion of Old Chrysler’s
Bridge Loan debt assumed by New Chrysler
• Default: Dollar-denominated eurodollar rate loans
Form
• Dollar-denominated Alternative Base Rate loans
3-month eurodollar (with a floor of
3-month eurodollar
Default
3-month eurodollar
2.00%) + 7.91%
(with a floor of 2.00%) +
interest rate
(with a floor of 2.00%) + 3.00%f
(Zero Coupon Notes did not bear interest
g
5.00%
until May 2013)h
Earliest of:
• June 5, 2009 (in the case that the
Final Order in the bankruptcy became
“final and nonappealable” before such
a date)
• June 29, 2009
December 10, 2011
(could be delayed to
• “the effective date of a plan of
June 10, 2017, for up to
June 10, 2017 (50% balloon payment
reorganization or liquidation that is
$400 million) (Chrysler, due on June 10, 2016) (Chrysler, New
confirmed pursuant to an order
Maturity date
New Carco Acquisition
Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
entered in the Cases by the
LLC, and Treasury 2009, 2009, PDF p. 46–47)
Bankruptcy Court”
PDF pp. 8, 41, 45, 47–
• The date of “the acceleration of any
48)
Loans and the Additional Notes and
the termination of the Commitment in
accordance with the terms of this
Agreement”
• September 30, 2009 (Chrysler, EDC,
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 22)
First lien on substantially all of Old
• Blanket lien on substantially all of New Chrysler’s assets
Security
Chrysler’s assets
• Equity recapture powers
Additional Notes ($253.46 million
• Additional Notes
Additional
principal for Treasury and $77.37 million
9.85% stake in New
($288 million principal)
consideration principal for EDC) (Chrysler, EDC, and
Chrysler for Treasury
• Zero Coupon Notes
Treasury 2009, PDF p. 322)
($100 million principal)
(f) See Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 8–9, 15–18,
(a) See Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 49, 95, 317,
20–21, 34–37, 302.
322.
(b) See Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 41, 44, 59.

(g) See Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 7–8, 16, 18, 23–24, 48–49, 52.

(c) See Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF p. 45.

(h) See Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009, PDF pp. 7–8, 16, 18, 23–24, 48–49, 52.

(d) There is no report showing the peak usage of the
combined Treasury and EDC commitments.

Sources: Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury
2009; Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009; Office of
Financial Stability 2018.

(e) See Office of Financial Stability 2018.
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The Operations of the New Chrysler
The UAW VEBA, Treasury, the Canadian government, and Fiat set down New Chrysler’s
corporate governance arrangements in the Amended and Restated Limited Liability
Company Operating Agreement of Chrysler Group LLC (Signed 06/10/2009), which this
case study refers to as the LLC Agreement (Chrysler 2011b, PDF p. 1).
The first order of business for the parties was to set down New Chrysler’s capital structure
and the provisions for changing that capital structure over time (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: New Chrysler Capital Structure
Stakeholder

Class and
number of
shares issued

Initial total
interest

Total interest
upon one Class B
eventa

Total
interest if
all Class
B events
occurc

25.00%
9.23%

Total
interest
upon
two
Class B
eventsb
30.00%
8.62%

35.00%d
8.00%

Total
interest if
additional
call options
are fully
exercised
51.00%
6.03%

Fiat North America LLC
United States
Department of the
Treasury
VEBA Holdcos (UAW
VEBA Holdco LLC CH-00
through 12)
Government of Canada
(Canada CH Investment
Corporation)
Total

200,000 Class B
98,461 Class A

20.00%
9.85%

676,924 Class A

67.69%

63.46%

59.23%

55.00%

41.46%

24,615 Class A

2.46%

2.31%

2.15%

2.00%

1.51%

800,000 Class A
200,000 Class B

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Effective January 10, 2011, after a Class B technology event (“Governmental Approvals for an engine [or a
vehicle containing an engine for which the Company received a Technology Event Governmental Approval] to be
manufactured in the United States and […] delivery to the US Treasury of an irrevocable commitment by the
Company […] to begin commercial production of the engine (or a vehicle) as soon as commercially practicable”)
(Chrysler 2011b).
a

Effective April 12, 2011, after a Class B non-NAFTA distribution event (the “Company recording cumulative
revenues following the date of this Agreement of $1,500,000,000 or more […] attributable to the Company’s sales
made outside of […] [NAFTA] following the date of this Agreement” and “execution by the Company of one or
more franchise agreements covering in the aggregate at least ninety percent (90%) of the total Fiat Group
Automobiles S.p.A. dealers in Latin America pursuant to which such dealers will carry Company products”) (LLC
Agreement 2009, PDF pp. 10–11).
b

Effective by July 2011 (Webel and Canis 2012, 5, 15), after a Class B fuel economy event (“completion by the
Company of the Fuel Economy Test on a Chrysler-produced pre-production vehicle appropriate for such testing
purposes based on Fiat platform or vehicle technology resulting in a fuel economy of at least 40 miles per gallon”
and “an irrevocable [Treasury] commitment by the Company […]to begin assembly of such a vehicle in
commercial quantities in a production facility in the United States as soon as commercially practicable”) (LLC
Agreement 2009, PDF pp. 10–11).
c

d Represented

by 200,000 Class B membership interests.

Sources: Chrysler 2011b; Canis and Webel 2012; author’s calculations.

143

The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C

Nye

While Treasury had already received a 9.85% equity stake and Canada received its own
2.46% equity stake as additional consideration for their post-petition lending (Chrysler,
New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 52; Chrysler Canada and EDC 2011,
6.18-1), the VEBA received a 67.69% stake in return for waiving a portion of its debt
obligation and other concessions (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 41) and Fiat received a 20%
stake as compensation for its technical contribution to New Chrysler (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 41).
The LLC Agreement also set down terms regulating changes in New Chrysler’s capital
structure. The most detailed of these related to Fiat, which had a number of mechanisms
for increasing its equity stake but was prohibited from obtaining a controlling stake in New
Chrysler until New Chrysler repaid all of its loans from Treasury and the Canadian
government (COP 2011, 53-55). As detailed in Figure 6, Fiat’s ownership of Class B
membership shares would automatically increase by 5%, diluting the stake of the other
three owners, which held the Class A shares, accordingly (COP 2011, 53–55) upon the
occurrence of any of three types of designated events, each which was intended to
significantly further Chrysler’s recovery effort (see notes to Figure 5).
If Chrysler was unable to bring about any of these events by January 1, 2013, Fiat would
still have an option to acquire additional Class A membership interests, diluting the other
owners. In such a situation, “the Fiat Group’s Total Interest […][would] increase by five
percent (5%) in the aggregate for each Class B Event that has not occurred” (Chrysler
2011b, PDF p. 13).
Although Fiat remained locked out of a controlling stake in New Chrysler until the
governments exited, Fiat also enjoyed the right to “buy up to 40 percent of the VEBA’s
equity stake at a market-based formulaic price prior to the IPO or a market price after the
IPO” at any time (COP 2011, 55). Once New Chrysler repaid its government loans, lifting the
restriction on Fiat’s stake in the company, Fiat could exercise an incremental equity call
option as well as a Treasury call option (COP 2011, 55). The former allowed Fiat to increase
its “stake by up to 16 percent” at a “market-based formulaic price” before a New Chrysler
IPO or a “market price” if the option is used after the occurrence of a New Chrysler IPO by
diluting the other parties. The latter gave Fiat the right to be the first to purchase
Treasury’s equity during the year following New Chrysler’s repayment of its government
loans (COP 2011, 55).
Treasury had several restrictions on the disposition of its equity, by virtue of Fiat’s
Treasury call option, but had significant powers over sales of the VEBA’s equity stake (COP
2011, 56–57). Under an equity recapture agreement, Treasury was entitled to “all proceeds
from the sale of any of the VEBA’s equity stake in Chrysler above a Threshold Amount, set
at $4.25 billion and growing from January 1, 2010, at 9 percent per year,” but it could
alternatively purchase VEBA’s equity “for the then-applicable Threshold Amount” (COP
2011, 56–57). However, the Canadian government maintained a claim over 20% of the
proceeds (COP 2011, 59).
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Corporate Governance and Management
The LLC Agreement set down a board of directors with nine initial members and gave the
CEO position to the CEO of Fiat (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 21–24, 29–30). The distribution of
the seats on the board were related to the distribution of equity stakes in New Chrysler.
Correspondingly the seats on the board would change as laid out in Figure 6 (Chrysler
2011b, PDF pp. 22–24):
Figure 6: Chrysler Board Seat Distribution Plan
Seats on New Chrysler’s
board of directors

Fiat holds at least a
20% stake (Fiat’s
initial stake)

Fiat holds at least a
35% stake

Fiat holds at least a
50% stake

Fiat North America LLC’s
seats on board

3

4

5

US Department of the
Treasury seats on board

4

3

2

Seats on New Chrysler’s board of
directors

Canada maintains its initial
stake and the Canadian loan
to New Chrysler is active

Canada sells any portion of
its stake or Canadian loan
has terminated

Governments of Canada and
Ontario

1

0

Seats on New Chrysler’s board of
directors

VEBA holds at least a 15%
stake

VEBA holds less than a 15%
stake

VEBA

1

0

Source: Chrysler 2011b.

Oversight
Even as the governments decreased their stakes in the auto company, they continued to
enjoy significant oversight powers. Each of Fiat, Treasury, the VEBA, Canada, and Ontario
received comprehensive financial statements from New Chrysler if the party in question
maintained an equity stake of at least 5% (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 42–45). The
governments also had additional oversight powers. Canada had to retain only one seat on
the Board to maintain access to financial statements (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 42–45). The
US maintained limited oversight by mandating that New Chrysler act as if it had to file 10-
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Ks and 10-Qs with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) so long as the US
retained any of its initial stake in New Chrysler (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 42–45).
Regulating Fiat’s Involvement
In addition to regulating Fiat’s stake in New Chrysler, the LLC Agreement also regulated
Fiat’s involvement in New Chrysler’s affairs. For example, the terms of the LLC Agreement
prohibited Fiat from terminating “any of its rights” as an organization with seats on New
Chrysler’s Board before June 10, 2011 (Chrysler 2011b, PDF p. 34). The LLC Agreement
also regulated Fiat’s involvement with several other terms. There were terms governing
the necessary conditions for a Chrysler IPO (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 39, 54–55). The LLC
Agreement also required that equity in New Chrysler acquired by Fiat through means other
than the Class B events be held in a voting trust until certain other conditions were fulfilled
(Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 39, 54–55). Additionally, the LLC Agreement restricted the board
from taking action that would disproportionately affect non-Fiat members if said actions
were taken while Fiat had a majority interest in New Chrysler (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 39,
54–55).
Outcomes
DIP Financing
Old Chrysler eventually accessed $1.89 billion from Treasury (Office of Financial Stability
2018) and C$1.28 billion (approximately $1 billion) from EDC under the Joint DIP Facility
(Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014). The US commitment terminated on June 30,
2009. Treasury recovered $159.57 million from the sale of the remaining collateral that
constituted Old Chrysler between May 10, 2010, and February 26, 2016 (Office of Financial
Stability 2018). Information on EDC’s recovery from its DIP lending commitments was
unavailable.
The Section 363 Asset Sale
With the beginning of the case, objections to the Section 363 sale from various creditors
began to pile up, the most notable of these being from a group of First Lien Secured
creditors calling themselves the “Chrysler Non-TARP Lenders” (which included the
“Indiana Funds”: the Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund, the Indiana State Police
Pension Trust, and the Indiana Major Moves Construction Fund) (Docket 3073, 11–12).24
The Indiana Funds argued the sale would violate the Bankruptcy Code’s rule of absolute
priority because New Chrysler would pay in full certain lower-priority creditors (the
secured debts of the government and the unsecured debts of the UAW’s VEBA as well as

The Indiana Funds held only $42 million of the $6.9 billion in first priority secured debt (Docket 3073 2009,
11–12). Other groups objecting to various conditions of the bankruptcy included the National Chrysler
Retirement Organization (Chrysler’s non-union retirees) and various Chrysler dealerships (Docket 1195
2009; Docket 1045 2009; Docket 1488 2009).
24
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several trade creditors) before paying the First Lien Secured creditors (Docket 3073, 11–
12; COP 2009b, PDF p. 15). The Indiana Funds also argued that Old Chrysler was being
underpaid for its collateral. They believed that the collateral securing its loans, which was
to be moved to New Chrysler, “would be worth significantly more than the money paid to
the First-Lien Lenders” (Docket 3073, 11–12) and that Old Chrysler “could sell the assets
for more money if they did not rush the sale, or that First-Lien debt holders could recover
more in liquidation” (COP 2009b, PDF p. 15).25 Therefore, the assets of Old Chrysler would
not be a “melting ice cube” (a situation where the value of the assets or business is
degrading), and they would not meet the “good business reason” standard needed to allow
the Section 363 sale.
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the Indiana Funds’ arguments and, on May 31, 2009,
granted Old Chrysler authorization to sell substantially all of its assets under the proposed
Section 363 Sale (Docket 3073 2009, 1). This order asserted that the proposed Section 363
sale was “similar to that presented in other cases in which exigent circumstances warrant
an expeditious sale of assets prior to confirmation of a plan.” The court concluded that “the
fact that the U.S. government is the primary source of funding does not alter the analysis
under bankruptcy law” (Docket 3073 2009, 1). The court argued that it had the discretion
to approve the restrictive bidding procedures and accelerated sale conditions, writing that
“if a favorable business opportunity is presented that is only available if acted upon quickly,
the court has to have the ability to authorize what is best for the estate” (Docket 3073
2009, 15). Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court said that Old Chrysler demonstrated the
Section 363 sale was such a situation, as Old Chrysler had already spent years seeking
alliances, finding that “the Fiat Transaction is the only option that is currently viable” and
that “the only other alternative is the immediate liquidation of the company” (Docket 3073
2009, 16–19).26 In its opinion, the court noted that any material delay of the Section 363
sale would damage Old Chrysler’s ability to succeed as a going concern (Docket 3073, 16–
19) and noted that the government’s post-petition financing (and thus the Section 363 sale
itself) was “contingent upon a sale closing quickly,” which made the proposed Master

The Non-TARP Lenders (which included the Indiana Funds) also argued that the short timeline and
restrictive bidding procedures proposed by Old Chrysler and the DIP Lenders were “designed to prevent, not
encourage, competitive bidding,” which the Non-TARP Lenders said contravened the “fundamental purpose
for bidding procedures” (in other words, “to maximize the sale price for the Debtors’ assets”) (Docket 286
2009, 2). The court would later declare that the First Lien Secured creditors (of which the Indiana Funds were
a part) consented to the Section 363 sale on the basis that all of its members agreed to be bound by the
actions of an Administrative Agent, which would be “made at the request of lenders holding a majority of the
indebtedness” in the creditor class (Docket 3073, 25). As the holders of the 92.5% of this indebtedness
directed the Administrative Agent to consent to the Section 363 sale, the Indiana Funds and other dissenting
Non-TARP Lenders had already functionally consented to the sale themselves (Docket 3073, 27).
25

Further, the Bankruptcy Court also explained that Fiat’s technology and access to international markets
materially contributed value to New Chrysler in return for its equity, which was essential to the legality of the
provisions of the Master Transaction Agreement granting Fiat its equity stake in New Chrysler. The court also
argued that the resources offered to New Chrysler (which would allow it to continue operating as a going
concern) and the $2 billion offered to Old Chrysler’s creditors would provide creditors with more than what
would be seen in a liquidation (Docket 3073 2009, 16–19).
26
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Transaction Agreement “the only optional available other than piecemeal liquidation”
(Docket 3073, 16–19).27
The Bankruptcy Court also rejected the Indiana Funds’ assertion that the $2 billion offered
by New Chrysler under Section 363 sale did not constitute “fair value for the assets being
sold” (Docket 3073, 16–19). The opinion contended that the Indiana Funds failed to offer
an alternative valuation or rebut the analysis by Old Chrysler that its assets were worth
less than the $2 billion being offered by New Chrysler (Docket 3073 2009, 16–19).28
The Bankruptcy Court issued another order on June 1, 2009, that formally authorized the
Section 363 sale, but the Indiana Funds quickly responded by appealing to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which stayed the sale on June 2, 2009 (Ind. State Police Pension
Trust v. Chrysler LLC [In re Chrysler LLC]). The Second Circuit heard arguments on the case
on June 5, 2009, and affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy judge nearly immediately
(Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 7). However, the
Indiana Funds then appealed to the Supreme Court for a permanent stay, where Justice
Ginsburg issued another temporary stay of the sale on June 8, 2009 (before it could be
consummated) (David 2010, 38). The Supreme Court issued an opinion denying the
request for a permanent stay and vacating the temporary stay the next day (David 2010,
38).29 The sale went forward on June 10, 2009 (David 2010, 39). A decision by the Supreme
Court on December 14, 2009, vacated the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and the
Second Circuit and also dismissed the Indiana Funds’ appeal as “moot” rendering the
opinion without precedential value (David 2010, 39).
Immediate Outcomes of the Sale
The sale resulted in a restructuring of Chrysler through a process similar to the procedure
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) uses for bad banks (Roe and Skeel 2010,
728; FDIC 1998, PDF p. 17). New Chrysler’s balance sheet looked much like Old Chrysler’s,
and the process was concluded in a record 42 days. As Roe and Skeel (2010) observed,
“never before had the government used bankruptcy to bail out a major industrial
corporation” (728). These commenters termed the process “unorthodox” and “a tour de
force,” criticizing it for its opaqueness and its impact on the rights of certain creditors,
whose priorities under the traditional bankruptcy rules seemed to be disregarded in favor

The creators of the Master Transaction Agreement partially accomplished this with a term in the MTA
declaring that “if a sale has not closed by June 15th, Fiat could withdraw its commitment” to purchase Old
Chrysler’s assets (Docket 3073 2009, 16–19).
27

The analysis claimed that the $2 billion offer (the value the experts found for Old Chrysler’s assets as a
going concern) exceeded the liquidation value of the assets by at least $800 million, having concluded that the
liquidation of Old Chrysler’s assets “would generate between zero and $1.2 billion” (Docket 3073, 16–19).
28

The Supreme Court wrote that the Indiana Funds failed to pass three tests required for their requested
stay: “(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant
certiorari […]; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below was
erroneous; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of the stay” (David 2010, 38).
29

148

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

of the intended outcome (728).30 The pre-petition First Lien Secured creditors ended up
with 29 cents on the dollar and general unsecured creditors received nothing from Old
Chrysler, although a significant portion of Old Chrysler’s unsecured debt was assumed by
New Chrysler, namely debts to a number of dealers and trade creditors as well as
unsecured pension obligations (see Figure 7 for a summary of the actions and outcomes
involved in the restructuring) (Blaylock, Edwards, and Stanfield 2015, 326; Ben-Ishai and
Lubben 2011, 81, 84).
Chrysler eventually borrowed about $1.89 billion from the $4.96 billion Joint DIP Facility
and about $5.08 billion from the $6.64 billion First Lien Credit Agreement (Office of
Financial Stability 2018).
In the reorganization that followed, 789 of Chrysler’s 3,200 dealership closed, more than
12 plants closed, the two-tier wage system was expanded, defined benefit pensions
disappeared for new hires, and health benefits were dramatically rolled back (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, 18). Although various dealerships that were “left behind” attempted to
pass legislation at the state and national level to ameliorate their situation, it doesn’t
appear that they succeeded beyond Congress’ creation of “an arbitration procedure for
automobile dealerships to seek continuation or reinstatement of franchise agreements that
had been terminated by Chrysler during its bankruptcy proceedings (Chrysler Group LLC v.
Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc., 3; Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 30).
New Chrysler continued coordinating a wind-down of Old Chrysler through the bankruptcy
courts until Old Chrysler “transferred its remaining assets and liabilities to a liquidating
trust and was dissolved in accordance with the bankruptcy court plan” on April 30, 2010
(Office of Financial Stability 2018; Canis and Webel 2012, 7). Old Chrysler’s liquidation only
returned about $160 million of the $1.89 billion it borrowed under the Joint DIP Facility
(Office of Financial Stability 2018). Old Chrysler was unable to fully repay its pre-petition
liabilities from the Bridge Loans. Instead, it settled its $3.5 billion plus interest liability with
a payment of $1.9 billion in May 2010 (Treasury took a write-down of $1.6 billion) (GAO
2011, 5).
That said, New Chrysler repaid all of its borrowing under the First Lien Credit Agreement
with interest (Office of Financial Stability 2018).
Fiat steadily increased its stake in New Chrysler to 25% in January 2011 and 30% in April
2011. It purchased the government stakes in New Chrysler by July 21, 2011 (6% from
Treasury for $500 million and 1.5% from the Canadian government for C$132 million)
after New Chrysler had finished repaying its post-petition financing obligations to Treasury

Roe and Skeel (2010) argue that the court violated the creditors’ priorities and did not appropriately apply
Bankruptcy Rule §1129, which provides inter alia for voting by creditors, requires disclosure of the
company’s business operations and the impact of the plan on creditors and careful evaluation by the court.
They argued that the court’s seemingly failure to follow this “long, precise §1129 checklist for compliance”
has set a harmful precedent.
30
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on May 24, 2011 (Office of Financial Stability 2018; Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 41; Office of
the Auditor General of Canada 2014).
New Chrysler’s equity was entirely divided between Fiat (58.5%) and the UAW VEBA
(41.0%) by autumn 2011 (Canis and Webel 2012, 8). In January 2014, Fiat purchased what
remained of the UAW VEBA’s stake for $3.65 billion and took full control of New Chrysler
(Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 29; Fiat Chrysler 2015, 81).
Figure 7: How Chrysler’s Stakeholders Shared the Burden of Restructuring

Source: SIGTARP 2009, 107.

Overall Outcomes
As a whole, the US government lost either about $1.2 billion, which incorporates returns
from the Additional Notes and interest, or about $2.93 billion on the Chrysler rescue,
depending on which source one relies on (ProPublica 2019; SIGTARP 2016, 103).
Nonetheless, Chrysler recovered, and as a whole the US automotive industry ended up
playing a significant role in the larger economic recovery, according to two former
members of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015,
27). “Although it is not unusual for the auto industry to punch above its weight early in a
recovery, it has played an unusually large role relatively long into the current recovery,”
with autos contributing more than “25 percent of the rise in total manufacturing industrial
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production, even though motor vehicles and parts account for only about 6 percent of total
manufacturing value added” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 27).
By the time that Treasury exited from New Chrysler, the company still had some
underfunded pension liabilities, though they were no longer a threat to its viability (GAO
2011, 15). Chrysler also remained reliant on trucks and SUVs as its profit centers after the
restructuring (GAO 2011, PDF p. 21). Labor tensions reemerged in 2015, when the UAW
nearly struck over more labor concessions after years of austerity (Woodall 2015). The
labor issues did not disappear. In 2019, workers demanded better compensation amid a
lengthy strike at GM and revelations of alleged bribery of UAW officials by New Chrysler
(Naughton 2019). Also in 2019, Fiat Chrysler launched talks with Peugeot owner PSA
regarding a possible merger, which were aimed at creating an entity with the “leadership,
resources and scale to be at the forefront of a new era of sustainable mobility” (Isidore
2019; Fiat Chrysler 2019).

II.
1.

Key Design Decisions
The bankruptcy-based restructuring was part of a multi-faceted program to
assist Chrysler and GM.

The restructuring of Chrysler was only one part of a larger attempt to rescue the American
automotive industry during the Global Financial Crisis. Under the auspices of the
Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP), the government provided financing for
restructuring to GM and Chrysler, but it also created programs to aid related stakeholders
such as suppliers, financers, and customers deemed necessary because of the highly
integrated and inter-dependent nature of the industry (Office of Financial Stability 2018).
GM and Chrysler first received aid under a set of Bridge Loans in late 2008 and early 2009
(see Nye 2021). Treasury provided assistance to suppliers that would continue delivering
parts, to finance companies that would maintain financing for new car purchases, and to
special purpose vehicles that would guarantee warranties on new cars (Klier and
Rubenstein 2012, 39–41, 49). GM also received support from Treasury during its
bankruptcy, which followed a similar legal framework.
2.

Policymakers decided to save Chrysler largely because of the risk its failure
posed to the auto industry and the economy.

Despite the sentiment among the staffers working on the restructuring that “from a highly
theoretical point of view, the correct decision could be to let Chrysler go,” they and
President Obama eventually agreed that Chrysler should be saved (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 40). A paper from two former members of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) quotes “numerous experts” who questioned the wisdom of saving Chrysler, believing
that it would make it more difficult to rescue GM, the failure of which would have been a
“major blow to consumer confidence […] at exactly the wrong moment for the economy”
(Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, PDF p. 2, 11). President Obama ultimately decided that the
“political and social reality,” rather than the economic fundamentals, made the case for
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saving Chrysler (Rattner 2011, 120). That is not to say a Chrysler liquidation would have
been an easy decision. Approximately 300,000 jobs would have disappeared, with the
impact falling heavily on districts that already had unemployment rates as high as 24%
(Rattner 2011, PDF p. 4). The CEA economists noted that “66 percent of Chrysler suppliers
were also suppliers to GM and 54 percent were suppliers to Ford,” meaning that Chrysler’s
liquidation could also endanger other producers at an extremely vulnerable time (Goolsbee
and Krueger 2015, PDF p. 15).
3.

Legal authority: Financing for the restructuring was authorized under EESA
through TARP.

The George W. Bush administration cited its authority under EESA, through TARP, to fund
the United States’ portion of the Joint DIP Facility and the post-petition First Lien Credit
Agreement, much like the rest of the spending under the AIFP. Although the Bush
administration initially argued that EESA did not give it the authority to use TARP funds for
aid to the automotive industry, Congress’s failure to pass a legislative solution forced it to
pivot (Canis et al. 2009, 9). On December 23, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson,
Jr., relied on Section 101(a)(1), Section 3(5), and Section 3(9)(B) of EESA to send an official
determination to Congress (Secretary of Treasury 2008).31 Paulson defined “certain thrift
and other holding companies which are engaged in the manufacturing of automotive
vehicles and the provision of credit and financing in connection with the manufacturing
and purchase of such vehicles” as “financial institutions” pursuant to EESA. He further
defined their assets as “troubled assets” eligible for purchase with TARP funds to promote
financial stability (Secretary of Treasury 2008).
During the litigation associated with GM and Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcies, the government
further justified Paulson’s determination as being in line with the intentions of Congress in
passing TARP, even after his successor as Treasury Secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, issued a
more specific determination on April 29, 2009, which specified that the relevant “troubled
assets” were “the debt obligations or equity of […] certain companies engaged in the
manufacturing of automotive vehicles” (COP 2009b, 74–76; Secretary of Treasury 2009).
The government argued that there was “a certain connection between the automotive
companies’ financing entities and the automotive companies themselves that permits the
use of TARP funds to support the automotive companies, thereby supporting the
companies’ financial divisions” (COP 2009b, 74–76). The Congressional Oversight Panel
discussed the validity of the Treasury’s arguments and concluded that the issue of TARP
Section 101 (a)(1) authorized the Secretary of Treasury to establish the TARP to “purchase, and to make
and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution” (COP 2009b, 158–59).
Section 3(5) broadly defined “financial institutions” as “any institution […] established and regulated under
the laws of the Unites States, the District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands, and having significant operations in the United States, but excluding any central
bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government” (COP 2009b, 71). Section 3(9)(B), allowed the
Secretary of Treasury (after consultation with the Chairman of the Fed) to define “troubled assets” as any
financial instrument for which the Secretary determines purchases “[are] necessary to promote financial
market stability […] upon the transmission of said determination, in writing, to the appropriate Committees
of Congress” (COP 2009b, 71–72).
31
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authorization “may never be answered with any finality” because it had not been brought
to any court to adjudicate (COP 2009b, 79).
4.

The restructuring used a Section 363 bankruptcy sale rather than a typical
Chapter 11 reorganization plan or a restructuring outside of bankruptcy.

The legal mechanics for Chrysler’s restructuring came from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Team Auto32 was concerned that a Chapter 11 restructuring might drag on for so
long that Chrysler would be destroyed in the process (Rattner 2011, 107). Consequently,
Team Auto facilitated a surgical bankruptcy for Chrysler using Section 363 of Chapter 11,
which could allow Chrysler to sell substantially all of its assets to Fiat and hopefully “clear
away old liabilities” quickly (Canis et al. 2009, 24).33 Bankruptcy scholars advocate for the
use of Section 363 in cases dealing with “ongoing losses, limited lender funding
commitments, and rapidly depleting assets,” where the faster procedure can help
“maximize the value of the estate, thereby increasing creditors’ returns” (Ben-Ishai and
Lubben 2011, 81). This type of organization had become popular among creditors by the
late 2000s, and, as a creditor, the Treasury decided to take advantage of it. However, the
Supreme Court vacated the various judgments approving the Section 363 sale in late 2009,
which leaves open the question of whether the courts would approve a similarly aggressive
Section 363 sale again (David 2010, 39). Some legal scholars argue that the order indicates
that the Supreme Court wished to keep the Second Circuit’s favorable Chrysler opinion
from being used as precedent (David 2010, 39).
That said, Team Auto did consider a more conventional Chapter 11 reorganization. Team
Auto began looking at the feasibility of restructuring Chrysler without Chapter 11 (even
then, using a prepackaged bankruptcy) only as the April 30, 2009, deadline neared and
Chrysler’s First Lien Secured Creditors offered a restructuring plan that would allow
Chrysler to avoid bankruptcy (Rattner 2011, 173–77). Apparently, “avoiding bankruptcy
seemed so unlikely that we [Team Auto] hadn’t so much as studied the numbers of [such a]
case where all the secured lenders were on board,” but the cost of such a restructuring was
surprisingly close to the planned bankruptcy (Rattner 2011, 175–76). Officials who were
part of Team Auto still opted for the Section 363 sale when it became apparent that some of
the First Lien Secured Creditors would not agree to this new restructuring plan (COP
2009b, 49), even though they knew that the 363 sale would provoke legal challenges
(Rattner 2011, 175–78; Feldman 2019).
A Section 363 sale, in contrast to a conventional Chapter 11 reorganization, could be
executed much more quickly. This is because they do not require various creditor
protections like “the drafting of a complete plan and disclosure statement, creditor voting,

“Team Auto” was an internal name for the government officials working on the restructuring (see Rattner
2011, 90).
32

Thinking on a GM acquisition of Chrysler’s top brands floated around Team Auto as Chrysler neared
bankruptcy (Rattner 2011, 160-162). Such an arrangement would have cost the taxpayer less money but
would not have saved as many American jobs (Rattner 2011, 160–62).
33
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and a confirmation,” which can delay the completion of a bankruptcy (COP 2009b, PDF pp.
45–49, 132). To have the sale approved, Treasury just had to get a majority of the creditors’
committee to agree and obtain approval from the bankruptcy judge. The governments
involved in the rescue believed that a faster restructuring would thus “preserve the value
of the business, restore consumer confidence, and avoid the costs of a lengthy Chapter 11
process” (Ben-Ishai and Lubben 2011, 81). However, Treasury also was able to use its
leverage as DIP lender to create a highly restrictive bidding process for Old Chrysler, which
essentially ensured that Fiat’s New Chrysler would successfully purchase Old Chrysler’s
good assets (Skeel 2015, 135). Unlike most Section 363 sales, Treasury had New Chrysler
purchase Old Chrysler’s assets at a relatively low price while assuming large “liabilities to
favored creditors” (Skeel 2015, 135).
Treasury officials emphasized that each stakeholder affected would still have “full
opportunity to have his or her claim heard” in the reorganization (COP 2009b, 35). Other
figures, among them the Indiana Funds and some bankruptcy scholars, thought that
Chrysler’s aggressive use of Section 363 circumvented such safeguards necessary to the
functioning of the Bankruptcy Code as absolute priority (Ben-Ishai and Lubben 2011, 79;
Docket 3073 2009).
5.

The United States and Canada jointly extended debtor-in-possession financing
to Old Chrysler.

Treasury and EDC agreed to a Joint DIP Facility to provide Old Chrysler with “the necessary
liquidity to sustain [Old] Chrysler during the bankruptcy period” (GAO 2009b, 135).
Although Old Chrysler drew only $1.89 billion from the Joint DIP Facility, Treasury and EDC
increased the facility to $4.96 billion less than a month after creating it (Office of Financial
Stability 2018).34
It is also important to note that Treasury believed that lending under the facility would
probably not be repaid in its entirety (COP 2009b, 55–56). However, the DIP loan still gave
Treasury two useful mechanisms that would allow it, and Chrysler, to succeed: liens and
control.
First, the Joint DIP Facility gave Treasury liens on nearly all of Old Chrysler’s assets that
were senior to all of Old Chrysler’s other creditors (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF
pp. 7–8, 30, 44). With this advantage, Treasury (and EDC) would be first in line to recover
funds from the company if Fiat pulled out of the deal and Old Chrysler collapsed during the
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Second, the Joint DIP Facility gave Treasury and EDC a lot of control over the bankruptcy
process as major creditors (COP 2009b, 44–45; Feldman 2019). The Bankruptcy Code
imposes no statutory limits on the conditions that DIP lenders can attach to their loans
beyond requiring approval from the bankruptcy judge (COP 2009b, 44–45). In the case of
This brought Treasury’s commitment to $3.8 billion and EDC’s commitment to $1.16 billion (SEC 2011b,
260).
34
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Chrysler, this meant that the US and Canada could effectively determine which creditors
(whether they be suppliers, trade creditors, secured creditors, or the UAW) would have
their liabilities assumed by the New Chrysler (COP 2009b, 44–45). The Joint DIP Facility’s
financing (and, as spelled out in Key Design Decision No. 10, Fiat’s acquisition of a fair
amount of Old Chrysler via New Chrysler) was conditional on Old Chrysler’s quickly
meeting several milestones in the bankruptcy process (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009,
PDF p. 55). For example, the facility had several different maturity dates, each linked with
one of the various paths the bankruptcy proceedings could take (GAO 2009b, 135). Some of
these terms triggered maturity by the confirmation of Chrysler’s reorganization plan, by a
set number of days after an early event in the bankruptcy process elapsing, or simply by
the end of the third quarter of 2009 (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 22). Such
restrictive terms reflect the extent that the Bankruptcy Code allows DIP lenders to obtain
leverage over the speed and shape of a Section 363 sale (David 2010, 66). However, terms
such as the various oversight requirements would conceivably help diminish the risk of
Chrysler collapsing during the bankruptcy.
6.

The bankruptcy was exceptionally speedy.

While Old Chrysler’s bankruptcy case remained active through at least March 1, 2016
(Docket 8460 2009, 1–3), it took Chrysler only 42 days to complete the portion of the
bankruptcy relevant to financial stability: the sale of the majority of Old Chrysler’s assets
under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (COP 2009b, 13). This was unprecedentedly fast
(Canis et al. 2009, 24; Docket 8490 2009, PDF pp. 4–5; Docket 8460 2009).
One reason for the speedy asset sale was that many policymakers saw Chrysler’s Section
363 sale as a test case for the GM restructuring (Feldman 2019; Foley, Goldberg, and Meyer
2010, 2). The results of the Chrysler restructuring would give Treasury time to modify the
plan for restructuring GM if anything went wrong (Feldman 2019). Additionally, the
damage from a Chrysler liquidation following a failed attempt at restructuring via Section
363 would have been significant but much more limited than it would have been if the
same were to happen to GM (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, PDF pp. 2, 10).
Another reason Treasury pursued such a fast bankruptcy was the cost of keeping Chrysler
alive with taxpayer money. Steven Rattner, Lead Auto Advisor at the Treasury Department,
argued that “each additional month of life support [for Chrysler] was going to cost $500
million to $1 billion, money that the Treasury would never see again if the company ended
up liquidating” (Rattner 2011, 127). Intuitively, the more time Chrysler spent in Chapter
11, the more likely it would be to draw on DIP funding to stay alive. Drawing more DIP
funding would mean that Treasury would receive less per dollar invested in Old Chrysler
when Old Chrysler liquidated its remaining collateral.
7.

Bankruptcy-related aid to Chrysler was structured as a series of loans, whereas
Treasury aided GM using a DIP loan combined with a debt-for equity swap.

While most of GM’s bankruptcy-related aid came via a DIP loan that Treasury and EDC
swapped for equity in New GM, most of Chrysler’s bankruptcy-related aid came through a
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Treasury loan to New Chrysler (Office of Financial Stability 2018). Two members of the
Obama-era CEA provided an explanation for this difference: Because of their different
financial positions, most of the support provided to GM took the form of equity, while
support for Chrysler was in the form of debt that needed to be repaid. One former Treasury
official who worked on the restructuring said that Chrysler aid was also less attractive
because “we felt as stewards of the taxpayers’ money, we could not put more money into
Chrysler than the minimum that we thought was reasonable for it to have a chance to
succeed” (Brookings 2014, 87). One could justify the less generous terms of support for
Chrysler in part because Chrysler was in more precarious financial shape than GM in 2009,
and in part because Chrysler was less pivotal for the near-term course of the auto industry
and economy given its smaller size (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, PDF p. 17).
8.

Treasury (and by proxy EDC) protected the taxpayer’s investment by obtaining
blanket liens, additional promissory notes, equity, and additional powers.

The primary way that Treasury and EDC protected their interest in Chrysler (both Old
Chrysler and New Chrysler) in the Joint DIP Facility and First Lien Credit Agreement was
obtaining first priority liens on substantially all of the company’s assets. The Bankruptcy
Code allowed the lenders under the Joint DIP Facility to bypass more senior creditors by
granting the DIP financiers superpriority status and priming liens with a few exceptions for
foreign joint ventures (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 7–8, 27). Treasury
similarly obtained a “first priority lien on all of [New] Chrysler’s assets” under the First
Lien Credit Agreement (Treasury 2009c).
Treasury and EDC also received the Additional Notes as additional consideration for their
lending (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 9, 49; Manzo 2009, PDF p. 168). Under
the law that created TARP, Treasury was mandated to receive some type of warrant or
some other type of additional security as consideration (EESA 2008, §113). For reasons
related to both Old and New Chrysler’s private status, warrants were not considered a
desirable option, so the Additional Notes were issued.35
For the Joint DIP Facility, Treasury and EDC received Additional Notes worth 6.67% of the
“Maximum Loan Amount” committed by each Lender (or, $3.04 billion yielding a $203
million Additional Note for Treasury and $1.06 billion yielding a $70 million (Additional
Note for EDC; Chrysler DIP Term Sheet 2009, 6; Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp.
9, 49). These notes had the same interest rates and terms as their related loan (Chrysler,
EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 9, 49).
Under the First Lien Credit Agreement, Treasury received a $288 million principal
Additional Note, about 6.67% of the working capital offered by Tranche C (Chrysler 2011b,

See P.L. 110-343 Sec. 113(d). This requirement emerged from various lessons of the late-1970s bailouts.
Namely, that the government could obtain risk compensation for its aid through equity participation—for
example, receiving warrants, as it did in its support for Chrysler in the late 1970s. In that circumstance, the
government, which had guaranteed certain Chrysler borrowing and received warrants for its assistance,
ultimately sold the warrants back to the company at a profit (General Accounting Office 1984, v-vi).
35
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182). Treasury also received $100 million in zero-coupon promissory notes (called Zero
Coupon Notes) as additional consideration for its Tranche C financing (Chrysler 2011b,
182).
In return for providing $2 billion in financing under Tranche B of the First Lien Credit
Agreement, Treasury received a 9.85% equity stake in New Chrysler and an additional
power over the VEBA’s large stake in New Chrysler (Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC,
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 52). The equity gave the Treasury an additional asset to restore
some of the taxpayer’s investment, while the power over the VEBA stake further limited the
UAW’s influence within New Chrysler.
9.

Like other elements in the auto rescue, the Chrysler and its stakeholders
endured shared sacrifices during the bankruptcy process.

Sacrifices by Board and Management
Team Auto introduced an entirely new board of directors for New Chrysler, replacing the
CEO of Old Chrysler with Fiat CEO Sergio Marchionne (COP 2009b, 16). As part of New
Chrysler’s corporate governance arrangements, Treasury appointed four of these new
board members, all from outside of the auto industry (COP 2009b, 16). Ron Bloom, one of
the key members of Team Auto, explained that replacing the board was meant to create a
cultural change within Chrysler, saying that Team Auto sought out a
new board of directors of people of extraordinary accomplishment in the private
sector [for Chrysler]; […] we have tasked them with the responsibility of overseeing
the management so that this culture change […] is in fact effectuated (COP 2009, PDF
p. 34).
First Lien Secured Creditors
The First Lien Secured Creditors received $2 billion from New Chrysler, financed by
Treasury, in satisfaction of $6.9 billion in claims, or 29 cents on the dollar (COP 2009b,
152). Treasury played an active role in negotiations with these creditors, with Ron Bloom
later explaining that such a strategy was “necessary to administer the government’s
investments and protect the taxpayers’ interests” (Rattner 2011, 172–73; COP 2009a, 135;
Treasury 2009c).
Second Lien Secured Creditors
The Second Lien Secured Creditors, Cerberus and Daimler, were also Chrysler’s majority
and minority shareholders,36 and Old Chrysler owed them $2 billion on a loan (Docket 190
2009, 7–8). They collectively agreed to relinquish their equity and forgive the $2 billion
loan (Docket 190 2009, 7–8). Cerberus also contributed Chrysler’s headquarters, and

When it filed for Chapter 11, Chrysler was owned 80.1% by Cerberus and its affiliates and 19.9% by
Daimler and its affiliates. (COP 2009b, 24).
36
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Daimler was also able to negotiate an agreement with the PBGC that reduced the size of
their pension guarantees (Docket 190 2009, 7; Treasury 2009c; PBGC 2011).37
The UAW
The UAW (as well as Canadian auto workers, or CAW) agreed to major concessions that
stretched from work-rule changes to retiree healthcare cuts (Canis et al. 2009, 27). The
UAW concessions were motivated by two goals. One, Team Auto wanted to bring down
costs to be competitive with the non-union transplants (the US-based factories of Toyota,
Honda, etc.) (Rattner 2011, 37–38). This is the reasoning behind such reforms as the
expansion of a two-tier wage system, the suspension of cost of living adjustments, and the
UAW’s promise not to strike for five years (Feldman 2019; COP 2009b, 18; Canis et al.
2009, 27, 76; Kesselman 2017). The other reason for the concessions was that Team Auto
(as well as Chrysler itself) wanted to reduce Chrysler’s massive UAW benefit liabilities
(Rattner 2011, 153–54).
The UAW’s VEBA “exchanged an almost $8 billion fixed obligation to the [VEBA] […] for a
$4.6 billion unsecured note” and equity in New Chrysler (COP 2009b, 18). While this gave
the VEBA a 55% majority stake in New Chrysler,38 the VEBA was “managed by an
independent committee of legally bound fiduciaries” and had only a single vote on New
Chrysler’s board (COP 2009b, 28; Canis et al. 2009, 58–59; Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 86–88).
The UAW did make major concessions, but its workers suffered significantly less than some
of Old Chrysler’s non-union workers. In a July 2009 Congressional Oversight Panel hearing,
Ron Bloom explained that “product liability and some workers compensation claims will
not be permitted to carry their claims forward to New Chrysler” (COP 2009a, PDF p. 26).
The UAW also received a superior arrangement to Old Chrysler’s secured creditors.
Traditionally, this would be against the Bankruptcy Code’s rule of absolute priority because
it gave “value to junior claimholders—including the US government, the Retirees’
Settlement, the UAW, and unsecured trade creditors—while failing to pay the senior
secured creditors’ claims in full” (David 2010, 32–35). However, the UAW received its
equity stake in New Chrysler on account of “new value” brought to the business and not Old
Chrysler’s obligations to the union, so the courts allowed the arrangement (David 2010,
49–50).39

The Congressional Oversight Panel gives background to both of these sacrifices, noting that “when Chrysler
filed for bankruptcy, its pension liabilities were significantly underfunded” and that the $2 billion loan was
part of Cerberus’ 2007 leveraged buyout of Chrysler (COP 2009b, 14, 27). Additionally, Cerberus, the previous
majority owner of Old Chrysler, “agreed to transfer its ownership of the Chrysler headquarters in Auburn
Hills, Michigan, to New Chrysler” (COP 2009b, 14).
37

Some secondary sources say that the VEBA received a 55% stake in New Chrysler (COP 2009b, 152), but
the LLC Agreement setting out New Chrysler’s structure and GAO reports show the VEBA receiving a
67.692% stake (GAO 2009c, 14).
38

The UAW officially received the equity as “consideration for” the concessions in its new collective
bargaining agreement with Chrysler, not for the VEBA restructuring part of Chrysler’s debt (David 2010, 31–
32). Treasury’s explanation for this maneuver revolves around the sentiment that New Chrysler would need
39
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Suppliers
Suppliers agreed to reduce their prices, but New Chrysler assumed many of the suppliers’
contracts (Canis et al. 2009, 27; Barron 2009).
Warranty Holders and Tort Creditors
New Chrysler agreed to assume the warranty claims of those who had warranties with Old
Chrysler (COP 2009a, PDF p. 37). New Chrysler also agreed to assume “Lemon Law
liabilities and executory contracts” outlined in the MTA that were made with Old Chrysler
(Wolff v. Chrysler 2010).
Dealers
Team Auto, bankruptcy scholars, and eventually Chrysler personnel agreed that Chrysler
needed to “dramatically alter its dealer network”; bankruptcy offered an opportunity to do
that easily (Baird 2012, 274; Rattner 2011, 194; COP 2009a, PDF p. 83). Dealerships were
notoriously difficult to eliminate outside of bankruptcy, due to various “franchising and
state laws” (Harreld, Marshall, and Lane 2013, 6).
There is no explanation from Treasury for the sacrifices imposed on Chrysler dealers,
though, unlike GM, “Chrysler’s dealer reduction would take place almost immediately” and
offered no appeals process for terminated dealers; Chrysler offered only an approximately
three-week transition period (Canis et al. 2009, 23; Canis and Platzer 2009, 21). Dealers
that remained viable also made sacrifices; they agreed to reduce their “service contract
margins” (Canis et al. 2009, 27). Chrysler dealers set to be wound down loudly protested.
They objected to the “short wind-down period (26 days) and lack of appeals process”
(Canis and Platzer 2009, 21).
Team Auto recognized that shutting down these dealers would be politically contentious;
Rattner noted that the restructuring had “relatively little Congressional intrusion—until
the two companies virtually simultaneously announced their dealer reduction plans
(Rattner 2010, PDF p. 9).
10. Treasury treated Fiat differently from Chrysler’s other stakeholders because
Fiat was central to its strategy for turning around Chrysler.
Treasury’s Team Auto saw Fiat (and its CEO, Sergio Marchionne) as a partner integral to
the restructuring of Chrysler (Feldman 2019; Treasury 2009b, 1). Fiat’s contribution of
technology and access to supply chains (rather than cash or debt) meant that the Italian
company would have limited skin in the game, but officials from Team Auto did not
comment on whether this posed any problems. While Fiat’s knowledge of small, fuelworkers and would not have been able to survive the shock of a rejected collective bargaining agreement
(Feldman 2019; Baird 2012, 279).
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efficient cars and access to international supply chains would help Chrysler’s brands reach
overseas, Team Auto used Sergio Marchionne to create lasting cultural change within the
organization (Rattner 2011, 80–81; Chrysler et al. 2009, PDF p. 10–11). Treasury also
structured New Chrysler’s operations agreement and its working capital in a way that
restricted Fiat’s actions. Fiat could not easily exit the affiliation and had to meet
predetermined milestones in Chrysler’s turnaround to increase its stake in the company
(Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 86–88). Treasury connected Fiat’s ability to gain new seats on
New Chrysler’s board with these milestones (Chrysler 2011b, PDF pp. 86–88). That said,
Fiat would increase its control of Chrysler even if Chrysler did not meet the various
milestones set out for its restructuring (Chrysler 2011b, PDF p. 13). Reflecting on the
arrangement as a whole, Fiat’s CEO said that he “had a very short leash” (Brookings 2014,
86). He explained that if Fiat did anything incorrectly or could not perform, Treasury would
have had GM absorb Chrysler (Brookings 2014, 86).
Terms related to Fiat also lent a sense of urgency to the bankruptcy, potentially speeding it
along. The Bankruptcy Court approved the expedited bidding timeline for the Section 363
sale because Fiat’s purchase agreement mandated that the bankruptcy be completed by
June 15, 2009 (COP 2009b, 132). If the Bankruptcy Court did not execute the sale by that
deadline, the government said that Fiat would back out of the sale and receive an additional
breakup fee (Docket 492 2009, PDF pp. 5–6; COP 2009b, 132).
11. The government’s behavior as shareholder was hands-off.
The government largely took a hands-off approach in managing its stake in New Chrysler
(COP 2009b, 28–29). It asserted that using New Chrysler “as an instrument of broader
government policy […] [was] inconsistent” with their goals (COP 2009b, 29). While the
government did have control over a number of seats on New Chrysler’s board, it sought to
limit potential political influence (COP 2009b, 12, 28–29). Treasury set down formalized,
but not legally binding rules for government ownership known as the “USG as
shareholders,” which “would add strict limits on government involvement postrestructuring to the existing edict that […] [it] not ever meddle in day-to-day management
decisions” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, 28–30; Rattner 2010, PDF p. 8).
The July 2009 Congressional Oversight Panel hearing summarizes some of the other core
elements of the rules. In the hearing, Team Auto member Ron Bloom noted that “the
government has no desire to own equity stakes in companies any longer than necessary”
(COP 2009a, PDF p. 21). The Government Accountability Office summarized:
Treasury’s role as an equity owner focuses on monitoring the financial health of the
companies in order to protect the value of Treasury’s equity stake.[...] Treasury
reserves the right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers and promote
financial stability [and] Treasury plans to oversee its financial interests in a
commercial manner, in which it will focus primarily on maximizing its return and take
a hands-off approach to day-to-day management. Treasury plans to reserve its
involvement for major transactions such as the sale of a controlling share of the
companies. Treasury’s role as a creditor is not as clearly delineated, but much like in

160

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

its role as equity owner, Treasury has said it will focus on monitoring the companies’
financial health.” (GAO 2009d, 14)
Still, the US government was also willing to use its stake to promote its industrial policy
agenda. The post-petition First Lien Credit Agreement’s “Vitality Commitment” required
that New Chrysler manufacture at least 40% of its yearly sales volume in the US or that
New Chrysler’s yearly production volume in its US manufacturing plans be at least 90% of
Old Chrysler’s 2008 fiscal year production volume from its US manufacturing plants
(Chrysler, New Carco Acquisition LLC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 76–77).
12. The President’s Task Force and Treasury’s Team Auto led the administration’s
efforts to restructure Chrysler.
Because its financing came from the AIFP, which was itself part of TARP, the restructuring
was administered by Team Auto, which was part of Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability
(Treasury 2014; Rattner 2011, 90). Team Auto drew upon the few automobile industry
experts in the federal government but was largely composed of restructuring and
bankruptcy experts. The team was “was notable for not including any individuals with
close ties to the auto industry” and one team member later reflected that the team had no
communications professionals (Klier and Rubenstein 2012, 39; Feldman 2019). The
primary reason for this seems to be that the auto rescue was considered a private-equitystyle restructuring deal, which tends to rely on nonsectoral financial and bankruptcy
expertise (Rattner 2011, 218). As such, Team Auto was intimately involved in the planning,
negotiation, and execution of the restructuring and was supported in its efforts by many
outside experts (COP 2009b, 49; Rattner 2011, 182).
13. Although a private company, New Chrysler agreed to provide periodic financial
reports to Treasury and publicly.
New Chrysler’s LLC Agreement committed the company to voluntarily filing quarterly
reports with the SEC (COP 2009a, PDF p. 35; GAO 2009d, 17). However, these reports are
only available beginning in early 2011 (Chrysler 2011c). According to Ron Bloom of Team
Auto, New Chrysler filed with the SEC “because there are taxpayer dollars at stake […]
giving the American people a periodic quarterly report card [was] […] proper and
appropriate (GAO 2009d, PDF p. 43). The LLC Agreement also required New Chrysler to
provide Treasury with monthly, quarterly, and yearly financial performance updates until
Treasury no longer held over 5% in New Chrysler (GAO 2009d, 17).
Because funding for Chrysler’s restructuring came from TARP, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (SIGTARP) had significant oversight over Old and New Chrysler (COP 2009b, 55–
56, 174).
Treasury also gained broad oversight over Chrysler through terms in its lending facilities.
The lending facilities required Chrysler to provide Treasury with “its consolidated balance
sheet and the related consolidated statements of income and cash flow, on a quarterly and
annual basis, and […] updates to its schedules of real property, mortgages property,
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pledged equity and notes, subsidiaries, and mortgage filing offices (beginning in 2010)”
until Chrysler repaid its loans (GAO 2009d, 17).
14. The rescue involved international coordination with Canada.
Treasury and EDC collaborated frequently throughout Chrysler’s restructuring, though
Canada’s influence on the design of the restructuring appeared limited. Canada was
extremely exposed to a collapse in the US auto industry (Foley, Goldberg, and Meyer 2010,
7). Canada ended up assisting Chrysler as part of the Joint DIP Facility, but it only
contributed to New Chrysler by offering working capital to Chrysler Canada, Chrysler’s
Canadian subsidiary (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014). Canada guided its
financial contributions using the principle that Canada’s total share of assistance would be
based on the ratio of Canadian automotive production to the total automotive production
of the three countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Office of the
Auditor General of Canada 2014). Canada and the US established this share at 20% (Office
of the Auditor General of Canada 2014). Canada also included provisions similar to
Treasury’s domestic production requirements in its own loan to Chrysler Canada (Chrysler
Canada and EDC 2011, 76). Under these provisions, Chrysler had to maintain at least 17%
of its NAFTA production volume in Canada while the loan and any of its related agreements
were outstanding and at least 20% of its NAFTA production volume in Canada by June 10,
2017 (Chrysler Canada and EDC 2011, 10–33, 76).
Although the Joint DIP Agreement provided for some burden-sharing between EDC and
Treasury (Chrysler, EDC, and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 62, 66, 68), Canada had to adapt a
number of its bureaucratic institutions to collaborate effectively with Treasury (Graham
2011, PDF pp. 4, 7). The Canadian government saw that it could use its loose equivalent to
the Export-Import Bank, the EDC, to disburse funds abroad through its “Canada Account”
(ISED Canada 2016, 10-11). However, when Canada wanted to participate in New Chrysler,
it had to find a way to hold its equity, as “the legislation for the Canada Account prevents it
from holding equity (ISED Canada 2016, 10-11).40 The Canadian government improvised
and used the “Canada Development Investment Corporation (CDIC) to hold the equity”
(ISED Canada 2016, 10–11). Canada also had no legal framework for the VEBA that was
going to take over Chrysler Canada’s health care obligations. Canada’s parliament later
passed amendments to its Income Tax Act that created a new category of trust for the VEBA
(Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014).
15. Treasury sought to maximize the taxpayer’s return on investment yet exit as
soon as possible.
Treasury framed its exit policy as “selling the government’s shares as soon as practicable to
recover taxpayer money and return the company to private ownership” (Goolsbee and
Krueger 2015, PDF p. 28). Treasury thought this would involve “either a private sale or a
These adaptions are explained by the fact that Canadian government did not consider the holding of equity
in or the disbursement of emergency funds to a private company, let alone one outside of its borders, as part
of its “core mandate” (ISED Canada 2016, 10-11)
40
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gradual sell-off of shares following an IPO” (COP 2009b, 38) The Congressional Oversight
Panel noted that Treasury’s “strategy hinges directly on the ability of the […] [company] to
restructure and become profitable” (COP 2009b, 68). Treasury eventually chose a private
sale and began indicating this direction in 2010, with the GAO reporting “that the
department is more likely to consider a private sale [for Chrysler] because its equity stake
is smaller [than in GM]” (GAO 2009d, 24). Treasury finally sold its stake in New Chrysler for
$500 million to Fiat on July 21, 2011 (Treasury 2011; Canis and Webel 2012, 12).
16. Communications regarding the rescue were unusually frequent and detailed.
Although one member of Team Auto later reflected that having a communications
professional on the team would have been useful (Feldman 2019), there were frequent and
detailed communications regarding the restructuring, which the White House appeared to
lead. Communications largely served three purposes throughout the Chrysler
restructuring.
Signaling Bankruptcy and Preparing Chrysler and Its Stakeholders for It
Because an automotive bankruptcy of this size was unprecedented, on March 30, 2009,
President Obama appeared on TV to discuss the government’s support for the auto
companies. He raised the possibility of bankruptcy and said that Chrysler would have to
radically change to receive government support. He characterized bankruptcy as a tool for
restructuring, rather than liquidation (PBS 2009). A month later, on April 30, President
Obama announced the bankruptcy filing (Obama 2009a). First, Obama communicated the
importance of America’s automakers to the larger economy and the implications of their
failure, (C-SPAN 2009b). Second, Obama asserted that many of Old Chrysler’s stakeholders
agreed to make sacrifices to make Chrysler become viable and execute a successful
turnaround (C-SPAN 2009b). Third, the speech painted dissenting stakeholders as “a small
group of speculators” endangering Chrysler’s future (C-SPAN 2009b). Fourth, the speech
characterized the government as merely supporting a restructuring that already had “made
great progress” (C-SPAN 2009b; Rattner 2011, 177–78).41 Last, the speech also continued
to describe bankruptcy as a tool for restructuring that would “clear away [Chrysler’s]
remaining obligations so the company can get back on its feet” (C-SPAN 2009b; Obama
2009a).
Explaining the Government’s Direction throughout the Bankruptcy
Government communications also painted the use of the Bankruptcy Code as conventional,
or even beneficial for Chrysler’s stakeholders. It discussed exactly how the restructuring
would use the Bankruptcy Code and posited that the seemingly heavy-handed terms of the
DIP loan were common. Ron Bloom also put forward the idea that the government behaved
just like any other commercial actor taking part in a restructuring, but that it also “gave
every affected stakeholder a full opportunity to have his or her claim heard” (COP 2009b,

41

There was still uncertainty pertaining to Chrysler’s transition to GMAC (Rattner 2011, 171–72, 177–78).
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35). He added that “every creditor will almost certainly receive more than they would have
had the government not stepped in” (COP 2009b, 35).
Convincing the Public That the Government Was Doing a Good Job and Asserting That
the Administration Was Going above and beyond Their Transparency Requirements
At the same time that President Obama announced the Chrysler bankruptcy on April 30,
2009, he also attempted to reassure workers by announcing the “White House Council on
Automotive Communities and Workers” (C-SPAN 2009b). The President noted that the
Council would be “reaching out to our hardest-hit areas, cutting through red tape, ensuring
that the full resources of the federal government are getting to the workers, the families,
and communities that need it the most” (C-SPAN 2009b). However, reports by the GAO
point to the Council’s being used as a tool for demonstrating successes in the auto recovery,
as it did not have a budget to directly assist communities (GAO 2011, 39). The White House
and Treasury also used other tactics to demonstrate the success of the auto restructuring,
which ranged from appearances on television to visits by the President to Chrysler
assembly plants (Obama 2010; PBS 2009).
Team Auto also made an early effort to show taxpayers how their investment in New
Chrysler was performing by requiring that New Chrysler file reports with the SEC (COP
2009b, 19).

III. Evaluation
The Obama White House said that the restructuring was a success, but responses from
within Team Auto were more muted. The White House released a report in 2011 outlining
Chrysler’s recovery, pointing to the working capital provided during the bankruptcy as a
turning point in its restructuring (White House 2011, PDF pp. 2–4). Director of the National
Economic Council (NEC) Lawrence Summers broadly said that aiding the auto companies
was not a mistake, stating that Chrysler was able to achieve better “relative competitive
position […] than I would have expected in the fall of 2009” (Summers 2014). Steven
Rattner, one of the key figures in Team Auto, complemented Chrysler’s return to profit
during the first two quarters of 2010, as well as the restructuring as a whole (Rattner 2011,
298, 301–02). However, Rattner was initially unsure of whether the “surgery saved the
patient” as of mid-2010, writing that only Chrysler’s performance in the next few years
would show that (Rattner 2011, 298).
Ron Bloom, another key figure in Team Auto, defined a key success metric for the
restructuring as the return of taxpayer money (COP 2009a, 38–39). Based on this metric,
the Chrysler restructuring was not entirely successful, as it did not result in taxpayers’
reclaiming all of their investment in Chrysler (ProPublica 2019). ProPublica’s Bailout
Tracker lists the government’s aggregate investments in Chrysler (including the $4 billion
Bridge Loan) as a $1.21 billion loss, but SIGTARP estimated the loss at $2.93 billion
(ProPublica 2019; SIGTARP 2016, 103). Two former CEA officials who were involved in the
auto restructuring have a more mixed view of the Chrysler bankruptcy. Austan Goolsbee
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and Alan Krueger were of the view that bankruptcy is an especially clunky tool for
addressing problems that implicate “cross-industry spillovers or broader government or
social costs” (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, PDF pp. 15, 26–27). While they note that
Chrysler outperformed expectations after its restructuring, they also suggest that “to some
extent, Chrysler’s gains [in market share] came at the expense of the other domestic firms,”
like GM (Goolsbee and Krueger 2015, PDF p. 22).
The Chrysler bankruptcy was subject to intense litigation and was extremely controversial
among bankruptcy scholars. While some scholars say that the only abnormal part of the
bankruptcy was the identity of the DIP creditors, Treasury and EDC, others criticize the
restructuring on two counts (COP 2009b, 130–32; Ben-Ishai and Lubben 2011, 79). (See
Docket 3073 2009 for the details of why the bankruptcy court rejected some of these
criticisms.) One argument is that Chrysler’s Section 363 sale was so aggressive that it was
effectively a stealthy version of a plan of reorganization (the legal term for this is a sub rosa
plan), which should not have been allowed because it circumvented the Chapter 11 process
(Roe and Skeel 2010, 736–37, 741). Although the structure of the 363 sale was sound, one
scholar characterized it as using Section 363 in a way that “extended the domain of Section
363 far beyond anything that had ever previously been attempted” (Skeel 2015, 136).
Without the safeguards required by the conventional Chapter 11 process, these critics
argue, Treasury was able to impose a procedure that unfairly discriminated in favor of the
UAW, made the bidding process uncompetitive, and ultimately validated sales that “were
not really sales at all” (Roe and Skeel 2010, 760; Skeel 2015, 136). A second argument is
that the banks constituting a large portion of the secured lenders, who approved of the 363
sale over the dissenting non-TARP lenders, had a conflict of interest due to their
participation in TARP (Roe and Skeel 2010, 770). Perhaps more significantly, these critics
thought that these flaws could weave their way into the substance of American bankruptcy
law (Robinson 2010, 516).
The Congressional Oversight Panel did not take a position on whether Chrysler’s
restructuring was successful in either 2009 or 2011. Addressing the auto restructurings in
2009, it claimed that Treasury had “not clearly explained how the various competing policy
and financial objectives involved in the rescue of the automotive companies influenced its
decisions,” signaling a transparency problem (COP 2009b, 57). In its 2011 report, it said
that it was too early to tell if the larger auto restructuring exercise was successful, but
things appeared “to be on a promising course” (COP 2011, PDF p. 4).
The Congressional Oversight Panel’s 2009 evaluation of the Chrysler bankruptcy mainly
summarized arguments by bankruptcy academics and creditors about the bankruptcy’s
potential impact on financial markets and prospects for taxpayer recovery. The panel
concluded that “it is both too early and, given the number of variables, perhaps not possible
to conclude one way or another as to what effect the government’s involvement in the
Chrysler bankruptcy will have on credit markets going forward” (COP 2009b, 53).
However, it also stated that “Treasury’s involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy […] is
likely to cause investors to reevaluate their risk assessment regarding certain companies
with similar characteristics” (COP 2009b, 53). Such a reevaluation might cause the “cost of
capital going forward for companies with similar characteristics […] [to go] up or down
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depending on how future creditors view the outcome of the Chrysler bankruptcy—whether
government intervention left creditors with more, the same, or less than they would have
received without such intervention” (COP 2009b, 53). By 2011, the Congressional
Oversight Panel still had some misgivings about Chrysler’s post-bankruptcy performance,
complaining that “Chrysler’s financial performance has been burdened by the significant
and costly debt it still carries, much of it related to the TARP” (COP 2011, 63).
The Government Accountability Office had a less positive view of the Chrysler bankruptcy.
Although it complemented New Chrysler for effectively reducing its labor costs, the
organization complained about transparency problems and the company’s continued
reliance on SUVs (GAO 2011, 15–19). The GAO also stated that Treasury’s exit strategy
wasn’t transparent enough for it to effectively assess Treasury’s performance as an
investor (GAO 2011, 26). The Office also had difficulty assessing the White House Council
on Automotive Communities and Workers’ performance, because the Council’s members
had “not tracked their assistance to auto communities or measured or assessed the results
of that assistance (GAO 2011, 38–43). The GAO believed that the restructuring “created
economic challenges for communities in which the companies closed a manufacturing plant
or otherwise reduced employment” (GAO 2011, 38–43).

IV.
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(Roe and Skeel 2010) “Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy”
This law review article criticizes the procedure used to restructure Chrysler. It presents an
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Second Circuit August 5, 2009, Decided)
Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion for the Chrysler bankruptcy, which rejected the
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20Governance%20Interim%20Final%20Rule%20and%20Correction%2006-15-2009.PDF.
(Docket 3073 2009) Opinion Signed on 5/31/2009 Granting Debtors’ Motion Seeking
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S.D.N.Y. (No. 09 B 50002 [AJG])
Opinion from the bankruptcy court authorizing Chrysler to conduct the Section 363 sale. The
Indiana pension funds’ appealed the decision and were heard by the Court of Appeals.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-0531%20Docket%203073%20opinion%20granting%20debtor%20motion%20for%20363%
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Press Releases/Announcements
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https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/canadian-officials-auto-industry-video.
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for American Auto Workers”
Video of Obama’s visit to a Chrysler plant that touts the success of the auto rescue.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fighting-american-auto-workers-visit-chryslerjefferson-north-assembly-plant-barack-obama.
“Presidential Remarks on the Auto Industry” (April 30, 2009)
Speech by President Obama announcing Chrysler’s restructuring via bankruptcy. It was
broadcast on multiple channels and transcripts appeared in major news publications.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/presidential-remarks-auto-industry-video.
“Statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner before the Senate Banking
Committee on May 20, 2009”
Statement outlining the state of the economy, which includes a detailed section on the actions
taken by the Obama administration on the auto industry through May 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Statement%20by%20Timot
hy%20F.%20Geithner%20U.%20S.%20Secretary%20of%20the%20Treasury%20before%
20the%20Senate%20Banking%20Committee%20May%2020,%202009.pdf.

181

The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C

Nye

(White House 2009) “Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative Chrysler-Fiat
Alliance”
April 30, 2009, press release discussing the requirements of a viable Chrysler-Fiat alliance as
well as support for Chrysler from the American and Canadian governments going forward.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Obama%20Administration
%20Auto%20Restructuring%20Initiative%20Chrysler-Fiat%20Alliance_0.pdf.
(White House 2011) “The Resurgence of the American Automotive Industry”
White House report making the case that the Obama administration’s actions rescuing GM
and Chrysler were successful.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/auto_report_06_01_11.pdf.
Media Stories
“Auto Bailout Still Largely Unpopular” (CNN 06/14/2014)
CNN coverage of polls on additional aid from the auto industry from 2008 and 2014.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/auto-bailout-still-largely-unpopular.
(PBS 2009) “President Obama Calls on G.M. and Chrysler to Take Restructuring Steps”
PBS transcript of an interview with President Obama by Jim Lehrer of PBS that showcases the
Obama administration’s approach to communicating its take on the auto rescue through
conventional media.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/president-obama-calls-gm-and-chrysler-takerestructuring-steps-transcript-pbs-newshour-jim.
“US Forced Chrysler’s Creditors to Blink” (Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2009)
One example of media coverage analyzing Treasury’s ante bankruptcy negotiation strategy
with Chrysler’s creditors.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/us-forced-chryslers-creditors-blink.
Reports/Assessments
(Canis and Webel 2012) “TARP Assistance for Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment
Issues”
Short report by the Congressional Research Service which offers an outline of Chrysler’s
progress post-bankruptcy as of late 2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/TARP%20Chrysler.pdf.
(Canis et al. 2009) “US Motor Vehicle Industry: Federal Financial Assistance and
Restructuring” (05/29/2009)
Congressional Research Service analysis of the lead-up to and execution of the auto industry
bailout as well as the various solutions for restructuring.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CRS%20Auto%20Governm
ent%20Aid.pdf.
(COP 2009a) “Oversight of TARP Assistance to the Automobile Industry: Field Hearing
before the Congressional Oversight Panel” (July 27, 2009)
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Statements by various stakeholders in the automotive restructuring shortly after Chrysler’s
Section 363 sale.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_hearing_20090727.pdf.
(COP 2009b) “The Use of TARP Funds in the Support and Reorganization of the Domestic
Automotive Industry” (09/09/2009)
Congressional Oversight Panel analyzing and providing recommendations related to the
creation, implementation, and issues raised by the use of TARP funds in the automotive
bailout.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional_Oversight_Pa
nel_September_2009_Report_20090909.pdf.
(COP 2011) “An Update on TARP Support for the Domestic Automotive Industry”
(01/13/2011)
Congressional Oversight Panel report updating analysis and recommendations related to the
creation, implementation, and issues raised by the automotive bailout.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_report_20110113.pdf.
(GAO 2009a) “Auto Industry: Summary of Government Efforts and Automakers
Restructuring to Date: Report to Congressional Committees by the Government
Accountability Office” (April 2009)
Outline by the Government Accountability Office that describes Treasury’s efforts leading up
to the bankruptcy filing of Chrysler.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/d09553.pdf.
(ISED Canada 2016) “General Motors and Chrysler Restructuring: Lessons Learned in the
Management of the Financial Assistance”
Canadian reflection on the organizational and administrative aspects of its government’s
actions during the auto rescue.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GENERAL%20MOTORS%20
AND%20Chrysler%20Lessons%20Learned%20Canada.pdf.
(Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2014) “Support to the Automotive Sector”
(Chapter 5 of the 2014 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada)
Report by the Canadian equivalent to the Congressional Budget Office that details some of the
financial aspects of Canada’s involvement in the auto rescue. It also discusses some of the
internal oversight problems that came with such an ad hoc program.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Canadian%20Lending%20C
hapter%205%E2%80%94Support%20to%20the%20Automotive%20Sector.pdf.
(Office of Financial Stability 2018) “Troubled Asset Relief Program Transactions Report—
Investment Programs for Period Ending October 5, 2018”
Transaction-level detail for all TARP programs except housing programs.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/tarp-transactions-report-investments-period-endingoctober-5-2018.
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(Office of Management and Budget 2009) “A Citizen’s Guide to the 2009 Financial Report of
the U.S. Government”
Oversight report containing a section on the AIFP, which includes the financing for the
bankruptcy.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/09frusg.pdf.
“TARP: Treasury’s Exit from GM and Chrysler Highlights Competing Goals, and Results of
Support to Auto Communities Are Unclear” (May 10, 2011)
Report from the Government Accountability Office that criticizes some of the initiatives meant
to maintain support for the auto rescue in affected communities. Additionally, the report
discusses several issues with Treasury’s goal setting process.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/318151.pdf.
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